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Bryan Leonard* and Shawn Regan** 
LEGAL AND INSTITUTIONAL BARRIERS TO 
ESTABLISHING NON-USE RIGHTS TO NATURAL 
RESOURCES 
ABSTRACT 
For many natural resources, property rights are established and 
maintained by using the resource, but this creates obstacles to 
the emergence of non-use rights for environmental or 
conservation purposes. If rights can only be established once a 
resource is used, then the institutions that govern natural 
resources will be unable to resolve conflicting use and non-use 
demands. This article describes the ways in which various 
natural resource governance institutions are based on use rights 
and the obstacles that creates for accommodating environmental 
demands based on non-use. It provides several case studies that 
illustrate the challenges of establishing non-use rights to 
rangelands, oil and gas resources, timber, and water. These 
institutional impediments to the emergence of property rights-
based solutions to conflicts over natural resources have been 
overlooked by many scholars, but they may be as important and 
prevalent as the common concerns over the provision of public 
goods and the free-rider problem. 
1. INTRODUCTION 
While the relative advantages of property rights over regulatory solutions 
to open-access problems have gained some acceptance among environmental 
economists, legal scholars, and policymakers, challenges to the broader use of 
market mechanisms to address environmental problems remain.1 The widely 
accepted view is that markets will under-value and thus under-provide 
environmental amenities and other conservation-related public goods.2 Under-
provision is of particular concern for resources and landscapes that have “non-use” 
values, which are by their nature non-rival and non-excludable. Typical examples 
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 1. See generally TERRY L. ANDERSON & GARY D. LIBECAP, ENVIRONMENTAL MARKETS: A 
PROPERTY RIGHTS APPROACH 1-20 (2014); see also Gary D. Libecap, Coasean Bargaining to Address 
Environmental Externalities 1-3 (Nat’l Bureau of Econ. Research, Working Paper No. 21903, 2016). 
 2. See John V. Krutilla, Conservation Reconsidered, 57 AM. ECON. REV. 777, 777-86 (1967). 
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include wilderness preservation, endangered species protection, and conserving 
scenic natural landscapes. 
Scholars and policymakers tend to prefer regulatory approaches for 
preserving the non-use value of many publicly and privately owned resources 
based on concerns that individuals would tend to free ride in any scheme relying on 
private provision.3 Private landowners that choose to protect rather than develop 
timber, rangeland, and water resources face the full opportunity cost of their 
decisions but only receive a small portion of the social benefit. Moreover, 
beneficiaries of conservation are dispersed and disorganized relative to the 
commercial demands for natural resources. Finally, the benefits of conservation are 
uncertain and concentrated on future generations. The conventional wisdom 
focuses on the commonalities between natural amenities and the class of pure 
public goods analyzed by Paul Samuelson and takes it as a given that the market 
cannot and does not provide adequate protection of these amenities.4 
In fact, as this article documents, true tests of the market’s ability to 
provide environmental public goods are rare because the state and federal 
institutions governing natural resources often exclude conservation interests from 
the mechanisms that determine resource use. The exclusion of interests is 
particularly true in the western United States, where state or federal ownership of 
natural resources is widespread and where property rights to many natural 
resources are established and maintained under institutions that have their origins 
in first-possession rules that were adopted in the nineteenth century to lower the 
costs of economic development during westward expansion.5 These institutions 
were accompanied by “beneficial-use” requirements that were meant to prevent 
speculative claiming for many natural resources.6 
The upshot is that the institutions that allocate federal grazing permits, 
timber harvesting rights, oil and gas leases, and surface water rights in the 
American West explicitly require productive use of those resources as a condition 
of establishing and maintaining ownership.7 With few exceptions, conservation 
groups are legally prohibited from purchasing and withholding from production 
state and federally administered rights to develop oil and gas, graze livestock, 
divert water, and harvest timber. In other words, even if the free-rider problem was 
nonexistent, there would still be little or no private provision of “non-use” of 
natural resources for conservation purposes because the law either does not allow it 
or makes it prohibitively difficult and costly. 
This reality raises important questions about traditional notions of the 
market’s failure to provide environmental amenities that can only be answered by 
closely examining the actual institutions that govern use and non-use rights to 
natural resources. The study of real-world institutions to shed light on theoretical 
 
 3. See generally John V. Krutilla et al., Public Versus Private Ownership: The Federal Lands 
Case, 2 J. POL’Y ANALYSIS & MGMT. 548 (1983). 
 4. See generally Paul A. Samuelson, The Pure Theory of Public Expenditure, 36 REV. ECON. & 
STAT. 387 (1954). 
 5. Gary D. Libecap, The Assignment of Property Rights on the Western Frontier: Lessons for 
Contemporary Environmental and Resource Policy, 67 J. ECON. HIST. 257, 257-91 (2007). 
 6. Id. 
 7. Id. 
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ideal types has a long history in law and economics. Until Ronald Coase’s study of 
the private provision of lighthouses in 1974 proved otherwise, prominent 
economists from A.C. Pigou to Paul Samuelson used lighthouses as an example of 
a public good that was, and necessarily always had been, provided by government.8 
Similarly, Steven Cheung’s 1973 analysis of pollination markets between 
beekeepers and orchard owners refuted the then-popular belief that pollination 
services were an externality requiring government intervention.9 
This article examines the characteristics of non-use values from 
environmental amenities and the institutions that govern their provision in the 
western United States to question the view—widely held by many environmental 
economists and legal scholars—that these amenities could not be maintained, at 
least in part, through voluntary private action. It also reviews the standard 
arguments about the externalities associated with non-use values and the 
implications for voluntary private provision. While economists have tended to 
think about non-use values as a classic “Samuelsonian” public good, the actual 
characteristics of natural amenities suggest that a more nuanced model of public 
goods is needed. Drawing on James Buchanan and Wm. Craig Stubblebine’s 
analysis of public goods subject to satiation and heterogeneous preferences, this 
article argues that private efforts to protect scenic landscapes and habitat could in 
theory approach efficient levels—that is, if existing laws and institutions allowed 
the private acquisition of non-use rights.10 
After exploring the theoretical prospects for market-based conservation, 
this article then surveys the institutions that govern the use of various state and 
federally managed resources. These institutions are specifically tailored to promote 
the use of natural resources and often preclude non-use values from playing a role 
in the market. The article then provides several case studies to assess the degree to 
which these institutions present real barriers to conservation efforts that would 
otherwise take place in the context of grazing, oil and gas development, timber 
harvesting, and water. It highlights cases in which existing legal rules have stymied 
the protection of amenities as well as cases in which institutions have successfully 
evolved to accommodate non-use values. 
2. THEORETICAL OBSTACLES TO PRIVATE PROVISION OF 
ENVIRONMENTAL AMENITIES 
The argument for government protection of environmental amenities to 
compensate for inefficiently low levels of private provision is older than the field 
of environmental economics itself. The idea dates back at least to A.C. Pigou who, 
in a passage that later served as the epigraph for John Krutilla’s seminar paper 
“Conservation Reconsidered,” argues that: 
 
 8. See generally Ronald H. Coase, The Lighthouse in Economics, 17 J. L. & ECON. 357 (1974). 
 9. Steven N. S. Cheung, The Fable of the Bees: An Economic Investigation, 16 J. L. & ECON. 11, 
11-33 (1973). 
 10. James M. Buchanan & Wm. Craig Stubblebine, Externality, 29 ECONOMICA 371, 371-84 
(1962). 
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It is the clear duty of Government, which is the trustee for unborn 
generations as well as for its present citizens, to watch over, and 
if need be, by legislative enactment, to defend, the exhaustible 
natural resources of the country from rash and reckless 
spoliation. How far it should itself, either out of taxes, or out of 
State loans, or by the device of guaranteed interest, press 
resource into under takings from which the business community, 
if left to itself, would hold aloof, is a more difficult problem.11 
Krutilla takes Pigou’s point about conservation of productive natural 
resources for future generations and extends it to a variety of potential values 
associated with nature.12 Krutilla’s analysis generated considerable interest in “non-
use” values associated with natural amenities and formed the basis for how 
environmental economists think about conservation policy.13 
Krutilla argued that scenic natural environments such as the Grand 
Canyon or Yellowstone National Park convey benefits to society that are quite 
separate from the recreational benefits associated with actually visiting one of these 
locales. This “non-use” value comes from the knowledge that places of unique 
environmental importance and splendor exist. While economists had previously 
been concerned with overuse of natural resources due to common-pool problems 
associated with production, Krutilla focused on “the problem of providing for the 
present and future the amenities associated with unspoiled natural environments, 
for which the market fails to make adequate provision.”14 For Krutilla and those 
who have carried on his legacy, the market’s inability to adequately provide 
environmental amenities is based largely on Paul Samuelson’s analysis of pure 
public goods, which share key characteristics with environmental amenities.15  
Ultimately environmental economists’ argument for government 
ownership and management of natural resources rests on the public goods 
analogy.16 Leaving resources undeveloped conveys public benefits, but it has an 
opportunity cost associated with foregone revenues from development. Because 
private landowners cannot be relied upon to bear these opportunity costs, 
government ownership and allocation of natural resources is seen as a necessary 
check against market forces that would otherwise lead to the development of places 
and resources better left unspoiled from a social perspective.17 While recognizing 
political challenges and other drawbacks, Krutilla et al. argue that public ownership 
and management of land and natural resources is essential for this provision.18 
 
 11. A.C. PIGOU, THE ECONOMICS OF WELFARE 29-30 (4th ed. 1932). 
 12. Krutilla, supra note 2, at 778-79. 
 13. H. Spencer Banzhaf, The Environmental Turn in Natural Resource Economics: John Krutilla 
and “Conservation Reconsidered” 16 (Research for the Future, Discussion Paper No. RFF DP 16-27, 
2016). 
 14. Krutilla, supra note 2, at 778. Common-pool resources studied by other economists include 
fisheries, groundwater, and conventional oil reservoirs. 
 15. Samuelson, supra note 4. 
 16. See, e.g., Krutilla et al., supra note 3, at 551-52. 
 17. See, e.g., id. at 554. 
 18. Id. at 549-50. 
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The supposition that markets cannot adequately provide environmental 
amenities is rooted in analogies to pure public goods and is at odds with 
distinguishing features of these amenities.19 More generally, there are many 
important departures from the class of pure additive public goods emphasized by 
Samuelson.20 Economist Jack Hirschlifer analyzes how different production 
functions for the supply of public goods affect the relative inefficiency of private 
provision.21 When the supply of a public good is determined by the “weakest link,” 
or smallest contribution, private provision can come close to the efficient outcome 
because free-riding incentives are dampened. Buchanan and Stubblebine focus on 
the demand for public goods and explore how heterogeneity in individuals’ 
preferences may allow for efficient private provision.22 
A key result of Buchanan and Stubblebine’s analysis is that externalities 
associated with public good provision may not be relevant for policy if individuals 
value the public good differently and can potentially reach satiation. Buchanan and 
Stubblebine’s example of two neighbors who share a fence is instructive: Suppose 
two neighbors, Adam and Bill, have abutting yards and both value their privacy, so 
that the construction of a fence between their properties would function as a public 
good between the two. Now suppose that Adam’s utility is increasing in the height 
of the fence until it reaches six feet, beyond which he is indifferent as to its height. 
Bill prefers more and more fence until it reaches eight feet tall, after which he is 
indifferent. The two face a coordination problem if they wish to equitably share the 
cost of a fence because each has an incentive to free ride on the other’s 
contributions. 
Several features of the fence example are worth emphasizing because they 
share important similarities to the public goods associated with environmental 
amenities. The first concerns the efficient height of the fence, which is found by 
setting the marginal cost of construction equal to the sum of Adam and Bill’s 
marginal rates of substitution between fence height and the numeraire. Crucially, 
beyond six feet, Adam’s marginal utility of additional fence is zero, and so the 
socially efficient level of provision is identical to the height that Bill would choose 
to maximize his own utility. In other words, if marginal costs are such that Bill 
decides to build a fence himself that is at least six feet tall, his private provision of 
the fence will correspond to the socially efficient fence height. 
Now, replace the fence with additional instream flow for trout habitat on 
the Yellowstone River, replace Adam with conservationists who derive non-use 
utility from knowing that trout habitat is being protected, and replace Bill with a 
local angler’s club that derives both recreational and non-use value from the 
augmented flows on their nearby river. The implications are several. First, the 
possibility of satiation in the level of environmental amenities means that not all 
non-use values are Pareto-relevant for efficient protection of those amenities. 
Second, non-use values need not be Pareto-relevant at all if there are substantial 
 
 19. See, e.g., David D. Haddock, When Are Environmental Amenities Policy-Relevant?, 44 NAT. 
RESOURCES J. 383, 400-05 (2004). 
 20. Samuelson, supra note 4. 
 21. Jack Hirshleifer, From Weakest-Link to Best-Shot: The Voluntary Provision of Public Goods, 
41 PUB. CHOICE 371, 371-86 (1983). 
 22. Buchanan & Stubblebine, supra note 10. 
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local, use-based benefits associated with conservation, such as recreation. Third, 
private provision of environmental amenities may be efficient if there is substantial 
heterogeneity in individuals’ preferences towards those amenities. 
Krutilla and his coauthors express significant doubt that conservationists 
could compete with commercial resource developers if the level of preservation 
were left to the market.23 The primary concern is the non-appropriable nature of 
non-use and option values from natural amenities.24 Another major concern of 
Krutilla et al. is that conservation interests are likely to be disorganized relative to 
commercial interests due to the dispersed nature of non-use values.25 The 
possibility of affordable private provision may not be as remote as many 
environmental economists suppose, for the same reason that the demand for 
specific amenities is likely to be satiable. 
Unlike many traditional public goods, the decision problem for amenity 
provision is often “develop or not.” If we imagine that the right to make this 
decision goes to the highest bidder for a resource or piece of land, conservationists’ 
willingness to pay need only exceed the next best alternative for that particular 
resource. This outcome may be feasible precisely because the supply of specific 
environmental amenities is often inelastic. In many cases, productive uses of a 
landscape such as livestock grazing, energy development, or timber harvesting 
have many available substitutes, whereas the amenity value does not. 
Ardently motivated conservationists may be able to outbid commercial 
interests for the use of specific landscapes if their valuation of the associated 
amenities is higher than the choke price for development. Huang et al. provide an 
example in the context of a hypothetical quota market for whale harvest in 
Norway.26 A possible outcome of such a market is that zero whaling occurs 
because conservationists’ willingness to pay for the last unit of whale quota 
exceeds the commercial value of a whale.27 The types of preferences that lead to 
this outcome place a high existence value on whales where the prospects for 
substitution between whales and income are limited for conservationists. This 
example is directly analogous to the existence-based non-use values associated 
with rare habitats and natural landscapes that lack substitutes. 
This discussion is not meant to imply that private provision of natural 
amenities would necessarily be efficient as a general rule. Rather, our aim is to 
suggest that the prospects for private provision are not so bleak, given the 
characteristics of the non-use values associated with natural amenities and the 
conditions under which they are produced or preserved. Our analysis does 
presuppose the willingness of some individuals and groups to engage in 
conservation despite their inability to receive financial compensation for the 
benefits. If these contributions are forthcoming, the market may reach relatively 
efficient outcomes, given the specific characteristics of environmental amenities 
and preferences over them. 
 
 23. Krutilla et al., supra note 3. 
 24. Id. 
 25. Id. 
 26. Biao Huang et al., Testing the Feasibility of a Hypothetical Whaling-Conservation Permit 
Market in Norway, 31 CONSERVATION BIOLOGY 809, 809-17 (2017). 
 27. Id. 
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With some noted exceptions, private contributions primarily go toward 
lobbying and litigation efforts rather than market-based acquisition of contentious 
rights to grazing lands, timber, water, and oil and gas.28 The standard narrative 
takes this pattern as evidence of the need for political decision-making to manage 
environmental public goods. This need not be the case. The characteristics of 
environmental amenities and the values they generate suggest that they could 
perhaps be voluntarily supplied by the market. Moreover, there is a substantial 
willingness of individuals to make contributions toward conservation efforts, based 
on the donation and operating budgets of many environmental nonprofits. But this 
raises an important question: If conservation groups and development interests 
could theoretically settle resource disputes using mutually beneficial market 
exchange, why do they instead engage in zero-sum political competition? 
Ironically, the answer rests in the public ownership or management of many of 
these natural resources. 
3. LEGAL AND INSTITUTIONAL BARRIERS TO NON-USE RIGHTS 
The institutions that developed during westward expansion still govern the 
use of most natural resources in the American West. Rights to land, water, and 
subsurface minerals were initially allocated using first possession rules that granted 
ownership to individuals based on the order in which they established a claim.29 
The use of first possession rules determined both the initial allocation of property 
rights on the frontier and the system of law that later developed to adjudicate 
disputes over those rights. These institutions evolved to economize on a specific set 
of transaction costs and to promote the most productive resource uses at the time.30 
Today, however, these institutions present challenges for coping with the new 
ecological and economic conditions facing the West. 
The distinguishing feature of first possession is that rights are allocated on 
a “first come, first served” basis. Implicitly, such a system requires some standard 
for what actions correspond to “making a claim.”31 Requirements for what 
constituted sufficient effort to make a claim varied across resources in the West, 
but typically required some amount of resource use. In the case of minerals, an 
 
 28. See TERRY L. ANDERSON & DONALD R. LEAL, FREE MARKET ENVIRONMENTALISM FOR THE 
NEXT GENERATION 1-12 (2015). 
 29. These rules developed initially to resolve competing mineral claims on federal land and were 
later adapted to other resources including land, water, and hydrocarbons. See Libecap, supra note 5; see 
generally MARK KANAZAWA, GOLDEN RULES: THE ORIGINS OF CALIFORNIA WATER LAW IN THE GOLD 
RUSH (2015). 
 30. Libecap, supra note 5; Ronald H. Coase, The Problem of Social Cost, 3 J. L. & ECON. 1, 1-44 
(1960). 
 31. This standard typically corresponds to some level of effort undertaken in the course of 
capturing or developing the resource. Robert Ellickson’s comparison of rules in the Greenland right 
whale fishery and the American sperm whale fishery is a case in point. The “fast-fish, loose fish” rule 
granted ownership only to whales that were fastened by a line to a ship (late in the capture process), 
whereas merely harpooning a whale with a marked harpoon was sufficient to perfect a claim under the 
“iron holds the whale” rule (early in the capture process). Different rules emerged on an informal basis 
for different species as whalers developed norms to overcome rent dissipation based on the specific 
costs of resource use in each setting. See Robert C. Ellickson, A Hypothesis of Wealth-Maximizing 
Norms: Evidence from the Whaling Industry, 5 J. L. ECON. & ORG. 83, 89 (1989). 
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initial discovery had to be marked and worked according to local camp rules.32 
Homestead claims required an initial filing with the local land office and 
subsequent improvement and occupancy of the land.33 Prior appropriation water 
rights were based on the actual diversion of water from a stream and “beneficial 
use” of that water.34 In these cases, a sufficient level of resource use granted the 
claimant a property right to a resource stock such as a mineral deposit, piece of 
land, or annual water delivery.35 
For some resources, bounding and enforcing claims to the entire stock is 
prohibitively costly and rights to some flow of the resource are allocated instead. 
First possession rules for allocating rights to resource flows result in a “rule of 
capture.”36 Under the rule of capture, de facto and legal ownership coincide once 
units of the resource have been fully appropriated. For example, successfully 
killing one’s prey is typically necessary and sufficient for establishing a property 
right to wild game.37 For resource flows, the rule of capture makes it impossible to 
establish ownership without directly harvesting or “using” the resource.38 
Moreover, use requirements reward investments by low-cost, high-valued users and 
increase the heterogeneity of claimants, reducing rent dissipation from races to 
establish property rights.39 
The relatively low cost of establishing rights to large stocks of valuable 
resources under first possession rules created the potential for monopolization by 
early settlers. Those settlers could potentially block future free entry by 
speculatively claiming substantially greater resource stocks than they could 
actually produce. To address this fear, rights to natural resources were often 
defined or limited to those who intended to develop the resource or, in some cases, 
to those that operate in a certain industry.40 
The upshot is that modern natural resource institutions typically have 
some form of “beneficial-use” requirement, which establishes certain use 
requirements that are considered valid for creating and maintaining valid property 
rights. But these legal and institutional structures create significant barriers to 
establishing non-use rights over natural resources today. Because rights are largely 
established based on prior possession and because maintaining their validity often 
depends on continued use, establishing non-use rights is a legal and institutional 
challenge in practice. 
Institutional reform has been slow to address new realities and shifting 
demands for landscapes and resources based on non-use, especially at the federal 
 
 32. Libecap, supra note 5. 
 33. See generally BENJAMIN HIBBARD, A HISTORY OF THE PUBLIC LAND POLICIES (1939). 
 34. Bryan Leonard & Gary Libecap, Collective Action by Contract: Prior Appropriation and the 
Development of Irrigation in the Western United States, J. LAW & ECON. (forthcoming). 
 35. Dean Lueck, The Rule of First Possession and the Design of the Law, 38 J. LAW & ECON. 393, 
393-436 (1995). 
 36. Id. 
 37. Id. 
 38. Id. 
 39. Id.; Libecap, supra note 5. 
 40. Libecap, supra note 5. 
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level.41 Laws such as the Mineral Leasing Act of 192042 and the Taylor Grazing 
Act of 193443 were formed at a time when resource extraction was the primary 
management purpose on public lands.44 These laws still serve as important 
institutional foundations for natural resource governance on federal lands today. 
Given the vast scope of federal land ownership—totaling 640 million acres, mostly 
in the American West—these statutes play a significant role in overall natural 
resource use in the United States.45 The same is also true for water and wildlife, 
which are primarily state-level natural resource institutions. Water is allocated 
under the prior appropriation doctrine, and rights are subject to beneficial use 
requirements across most of the West.46 Most states have expanded their definitions 
of “beneficial use” to accommodate new demands, but institutional change has not 
been uniform.47 Though not explored in this article, wildlife provides yet another 
example. Wildlife rights are established via rule-of-capture notions in which 
individuals gain possession of wildlife once they are harvested. “Non-used” or non-
harvested species are effectively unowned and under the control of the state 
wildlife agency.48 
 
 41. See id. at 259 (noting that “path dependencies in property rules are real, and they have 
dominated the economic history of resource use in the West”). 
 42. Mineral Leasing Act of 1920, 30 U.S.C. §§ 181-287 (2012). 
 43. 43 U.S.C. §§ 315-316 (2012). 
 44. See, e.g., GARY D. LIBECAP, LOCKING UP THE RANGE: FEDERAL LAND CONTROLS AND 
GRAZING 72 (1981) (noting that “failure to fully stock the [public] range carries the threat of a formal 
and permanent cut in stocking authorizations” by the Bureau of Land Management); see generally 
ROBERT H. NELSON, PUBLIC LANDS AND PRIVATE RIGHTS: THE FAILURE OF SCIENTIFIC MANAGEMENT 
(1995). 
 45. See CAROL HARDY VINCENT, LAURA A. HANSON, & CARLA N. ARGUETA, CONG. RESEARCH 
SERV., R42346, FEDERAL LAND OWNERSHIP: OVERVIEW AND DATA (2017), 
https://fas.org/sgp/crs/misc/R42346.pdf. In the American West, for instance, nearly half of the land 
(46.4 percent) is federally owned. This refers to the eleven coterminous western states: California, 
Nevada, Oregon, Washington, Arizona, New Mexico, Idaho, Montana, Wyoming, Colorado, and Utah. 
 46. Leonard & Libecap, supra note 34; see also Brandon Scarborough, Environmental Water 
Markets: Restoring Streams Through Trade, 46 PERC POL’Y SERIES 1 (2010), 
https://www.perc.org/wp-content/uploads/old/ps46.pdf. 
 47. Id.; see Dominic P. Parker, Land Trusts and the Choice to Conserve Land with Conservation 
Easements or Full Ownership, 44 NAT. RESOURCES J. 519 (2004). There are, of course, notable 
conservation efforts occurring on privately owned lands in which conservation groups or land trusts 
acquire or contract for rights for “non-use” purposes through conservation easements, direct payments 
for conservation, or even full ownership of land. While these efforts are noteworthy and significant, this 
article focuses on the state and federal institutions that govern natural resource use, which exert a 
dramatic influence on overall natural resource management on both public and private lands. This is 
especially true in the American West, where public ownership of natural resources is widespread and 
often directly implicates natural resource management on private lands. Wildlife management and water 
rights, for example, are the purview of the states, even when they flow across private lands. See Reed 
Watson, Public Wildlife on Private Land: Unifying the Split Estate to Enhance Trust Resources, 23 
DUKE ENVTL. L. & POL’Y F. 291, 291-321 (2013). Likewise, livestock management on private lands is 
often directly influenced by public land grazing rights, which are tied to private “base properties.” See 
infra Part 4. 
 48. Some states have proposed creating non-use, conservation-oriented tags or “stamps” for certain 
species to enable non-hunters to contribute to wildlife conservation and management in a manner similar 
to the way hunters and anglers fund wildlife agencies through the purchase of hunting and fishing 
licenses. In 2014, for instance, the Montana Department of Fish, Wildlife, and Parks proposed creating a 
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If competing groups cannot trade or acquire rights to natural resources, 
whether for use or non-use purposes, the alternative is to fight in the political arena. 
In the environmental context, this often means lobbying for additional regulation 
and litigating under the umbrella of existing regulation such as the Endangered 
Species Act49 and National Environmental Policy Act.50 These tactics at times have 
undoubtedly generated outcomes that conservationists prefer. But a fundamental 
point of this article is to clarify that this need not be the only way to achieve their 
goals. In fact, there is evidence that groups are attempting to use other market-
based mechanisms to directly acquire non-use rights.51 
The following sections explore specific resources and case studies that 
illustrate these challenges. They describe the barriers to establishing non-use rights 
and summarize various efforts by conservation groups to use market mechanisms 
to acquire rights to natural resources. In many cases, the existing institutional 
frameworks that govern natural resource use simply cannot accommodate new, 
non-use demands for natural resources. In other cases, rules may provide a partial 
or insecure set of rights that can be used for non-use purposes, but to the extent that 
non-use rights can be acquired and held as valid rights, transaction costs are high 
and rights are weak or uncertain. In some instances, groups have been able to find 
creative ways to acquire non-use rights within the traditional institutional 
framework, and for some natural resources, reforms have been implemented to 
explicitly allow certain forms of non-use rights. 
4. GRAZING 
Livestock grazing is the most widespread form of land use in the western 
United States, occurring on approximately 70 percent of the land in the region.52 
Much of this grazing occurs on public rangelands managed by the Bureau of Land 
Management (BLM) or the U.S. Forest Service (USFS).53 As “the nation’s largest 
 
“wolf stamp” that could be purchased by non-hunters as an alternative to a traditional hunting tag. The 
revenues from the stamp would have been used to fund the state’s livestock loss reduction program, 
wolf monitoring, habitat projects, research, and law enforcement. The proposal was opposed by several 
sportsmen groups over concerns that allowing non-hunters to fund the wildlife agency would impact 
wildlife management to the detriment of hunting interests, and the proposal was ultimately rejected. See 
Laura Lundquist, Statewide Wolf Stamp Meeting Gathers Heated Comment, BOZEMAN DAILY CHRON., 
Aug. 15, 2014 (quoting one sportsman saying “I’m against anything that would allow these guys to have 
a seat at the sportsmen’s table”). 
 49. 16 U.S.C. § 1531 (2012). 
 50. 42 U.S.C. § 4321 (2012). 
 51. See Terry L. Anderson & Dominic P. Parker, Transaction Costs and Environmental Markets, 7 
REV. ENVTL. ECON. & POL’Y 259-75 (2013) (discussing, in part, how non-use rights emerge to some 
resources). 
 52. See Thomas L. Fleischner, Ecological Costs of Livestock Grazing in Western North America, 8 
CONSERVATION BIOLOGY 629 (1994) (referring to the 11 coterminous western states). 
 53. See About Rangeland Management, U.S. DEP’T AGRIC., FOREST SERV., https://
www.fs.fed.us/rangeland-management/aboutus/index.shtml (last visited Feb. 21, 2019) (Of the 770 
million acres of rangelands in the United States, more than half are in private ownership, 43 percent are 
under federal ownership, and state and local governments manage the remainder). In addition to BLM 
and Forest Service lands, livestock grazing also occurs on in some federal wildlife refuges and even in 
some federal wilderness areas and national parks. 
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landlord,”54 the BLM manages livestock grazing on 155 million of its 248 million 
acres of total landholdings, the vast majority of which are in western states.55 The 
agency manages nearly 18,000 grazing permits and leases held by ranchers who 
graze livestock at least part of the year on more than 21,000 federal grazing 
allotments.56 The USFS administers a similar grazing program across 95 million of 
the 193 million acres, including nearly 6,000 grazing permittees.57 Together, these 
two federal agencies authorized more than 19 million animal unit months’ (AUMs) 
worth of livestock grazing on public lands in 2015.58 
Federal land grazing is a prime candidate for the emergence of non-use 
rights. Federal rangelands used for livestock grazing are often of low economic 
value. It takes an average of about 18 acres of BLM rangelands to provide enough 
forage to support one cow and calf for one month.59 It is not surprising that, in 
many parts of the western United States, the economic value of forage on public 
lands for livestock grazing is quite low. Yet in some areas, rangelands have 
considerable environmental, recreational, or other non-consumptive values. Thus, 
when public rangelands have significant value for non-use purposes such as 
wildlife habitat, watershed protection, recreation opportunities, or the preservation 
of other environmental amenities, there is in theory an opportunity for various 
groups interested in preserving such values to simply contract for the rights. 
Indeed, due to these and other factors, livestock grazing has attracted the 
attention of conservation groups seeking to acquire non-use rights to rangeland 
areas with high environmental values. Gradually since the 1990s, various 
individuals and environmental groups attempted to purchase grazing leases from 
ranchers for the purpose of conserving rangelands, ultimately seeking to reduce 
grazing or remove cattle altogether from certain public grazing allotments.60 Some 
have even proposed large-scale buyouts of public grazing permits.61 These efforts, 
explored in more detail below, have encountered significant challenges due to the 
 
 54. JAMES R. SKILLEN, THE NATION’S LARGEST LANDLORD: THE BUREAU OF LAND MANAGEMENT 
IN THE AMERICAN WEST (2009). 
 55. See Livestock Grazing on Public Lands, BUREAU LAND MGMT., U.S. DEP’T INTERIOR, 
https://www.blm.gov/programs/natural-resources/rangelands-and-grazing/livestock-grazing (last visited 
Sept. 28, 2018); see also CAROL HARDY VINCENT, LAURA A. HANSON, & CARLA N. ARGUETA, CONG. 
RESEARCH SERV., R42346, FEDERAL LAND OWNERSHIP: OVERVIEW AND DATA (2017). 
 56. See BUREAU LAND MGMT., U.S. DEP’T INTERIOR, supra note 55. 
 57. U.S. DEP’T OF AGRIC., FOREST SERV., GRAZING STATISTICAL SUMMARY, FY2015 (2016), 
https://www.fs.fed.us/rangeland-management/documents/grazing-
stats/2010s/GrazingStatisticalSummaryFY2015.pdf. 
 58. See BUREAU OF LAND MGMT., U.S. DEP’T OF INTERIOR, PUBLIC LAND STATISTICS 2015, 85 
(2016), 
https://www.blm.gov/sites/blm.gov/files/documents/files/Public%20Land%20Statistics2015%20%281%
29.pdf; U.S. DEP’T OF AGRIC., FOREST SERV., supra note 57. An animal unit month refers to the amount 
of forage that a cow and her calf eat in a month (or one bull, one steer, one horse, or five sheep). 
 59. See BUREAU OF LAND MGMT., U.S. DEP’T OF INTERIOR, supra note 58. 
 60. John D. Leshy & Molly S. McUsic, Where’s the Beef? Facilitating Voluntary Retirement of 
Federal Lands from Livestock Grazing, 17 N.Y.U. ENVTL. L.J. 368, 374 (2008). 
 61. See Mark Salvo & Andy Kerr, The National Public Lands Grazing Campaign, 11 WILD EARTH 
83, 83-84 (2001-2002) In the early 2000s, a group known as the National Public Lands Grazing 
Campaign led an unsuccessful effort to convince Congress to pass legislation authorizing large-scale 
buyouts of federal grazing permits for a variety of purposes, including environmental protection. 
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various use requirements of existing grazing institutions, which typically require 
traditional “use” of public rangelands as a basis for maintaining valid grazing 
rights. With some notable exceptions, the acquisition of non-use rights is prohibited 
under the current laws and regulations governing grazing on federal rangelands. 
A brief description of the evolution of public-land grazing rights helps 
explain the fundamental challenges. U.S. land policy in the nineteenth century 
encouraged western settlement but placed strict limits on the amount of land that 
could be claimed to 160, 320, and later to 640 acres.62 While such land claim sizes 
may have been adequate in the wetter climates of eastern states, they were ill-suited 
for the realities of the arid western landscape. In the drier climate of the West, such 
small farm sizes meant that eastern-style agriculture was an impractical form of 
land use. To “prove up” land claims, as required under the various homestead acts, 
livestock grazing became the dominant land use in western states.63 Yet, due to the 
region’s arid climate, livestock grazing required large amounts of land, so livestock 
owners relied upon nearby unclaimed lands on the public domain (which were less 
productive than the lands settlers chose to homestead and, hence, later become 
privatized). 
Thus emerged an informal system of grazing rights to the open range in 
which ranchers held fee-simple rights to small amounts of deeded land, originating 
through homestead act claims, as well as informal claims to large amounts of 
public domain land on which to sustain their livestock operations. Towards the end 
of the nineteenth century, this use of the public domain for livestock grazing had 
evolved into a set of customary rights that were generally recognized as valid and 
were enforced by local institutions.64 Cattlemen’s associations, for instance, 
enforced use rights to public rangelands, and rights were established by beneficial 
use or occupancy requirements.65 
This informal system of public rangeland use was later formalized with 
the passage of the Taylor Grazing Act in 1934.66 The Act gave the secretary of the 
Department of the Interior the authority to create grazing districts on unclaimed 
public lands, issue grazing permits, charge grazing fees, and to establish various 
 
 62. Paul W. Gates, Homesteading in the High Plains, 51 AGRIC. GREAT PLAINS 109, 122, 128 
(1977). The original Homestead Act of 1862 allowed 160-acre homestead claims. The Kinkaid Act of 
1904 authorized 640-acre claims in western Nebraska. In 1909, 320-acre claims were allowed. In 1916, 
the Stock-Raising Homestead Act allowed 640-acre claims of grazing lands. 
 63. TERRY L. ANDERSON & PETER JENSEN HILL, THE NOT SO WILD, WILD WEST: PROPERTY 
RIGHTS ON THE FRONTIER 189 (2004). 
 64. See Libecap, supra note 5, at 16 (quoting one early rancher’s description of these rights: “A 
custom has grown up and become thoroughly established among people of this community that once a 
stock man has developed water on and taken possession of the range by fully stocking the same that he 
will not be molested by other stockmen in his possession and enjoyment of such range”). 
 65. See R. Taylor Dennen, Cattlemen’s Associations and Property Rights in Land in the American 
West, 13 EXPORATIONS ECON. HIST. 423, 423-34 (1975) (examining livestock associations and the rules 
under which they operated to constrain entry and use of the public-domain rangelands). Among other 
requirements, this included restrictions on the number of animals that could be grazed and limiting 
participation to only those ranchers with patented homestead claims and locally recognized rangeland 
claims. See also Libecap, supra note 5, at 17. 
 66. Taylor Grazing Act of 1934, Pub. L. No. 73-482, 48 Stat. 1269 (codified at 48 U.S.C. § 315 
(2012)(the Grazing Service later merged with the General Land Office in 1946 to form the Bureau of 
Land Management). 
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rules and regulations to administer the federal grazing program.67 Although 
subsequent acts have imposed additional environmental provisions and land-use 
planning procedures, the system of grazing districts, permits, and fees established 
under the Taylor Grazing Act forms the foundation of federal grazing policy 
today.68 Under the provisions of the Act, eligible ranchers can receive a permit to 
graze livestock on a designated federal grazing allotment. The secretary of the 
interior can determine the amount of livestock grazing authorized by each permit 
holder as well as the season, duration of use, and stocking rates for each permit.69 
Grazing permits are issued for periods of up to ten years, and permit holders have 
priority over others to renew the permit for additional ten-year periods without 
competition.70 
Ranchers are eligible to receive preference for obtaining a grazing permit 
only if they meet certain conditions. One such requirement is that ranchers must 
own or control a nearby “base property,” a tract of private land that is capable of 
serving as the base for the permittee’s livestock operation.71 Federal grazing 
permits cannot be held by or transferred to individuals that do not hold qualifying 
base properties, as determined by the BLM.72 In practice, when base-property 
ranches are bought and sold, federal grazing permits are often transferred along to 
the new property owners. By attaching federal grazing permits to specific private 
base properties in this way, permits take on economic value and often represent a 
significant portion of a ranch’s total value.73 
The assignment of grazing privileges under the Taylor Grazing Act also 
requires that preference be given to those who reside within or near a grazing 
district and who are “engaged in the livestock business, bona fide occupants or 
 
 67. See, e.g., FOREST SERV. & BUREAU OF LAND MGMT., GRAZING ADMINISTRATION 
REQUIREMENTS AND PROCESSES, https://www.fs.fed.us/rangeland-management/documents/grazing/
BLMGrazingAdministrationRequirementsProcesses201708.pdf (last visited Feb. 21, 2019) (pertaining 
to grazing policies administered by the Bureau of Land Management, which is an agency within the 
U.S. Department of the Interior, but a nearly identical process applies to the grazing on lands managed 
by the U.S. Forest Service, which is housed within the U.S. Department of Agriculture). 
 68. See George C. Coggins, The Law of Public Rangeland Management IV: FLPMA, PRIA, and the 
Multiple Use Mandate, 14 ENVTL. L. 81 (1983). 
 69. 43 U.S.C. § 315b (2017). 
 70. Id. 
 71. See BUREAU LAND MGMT., U.S. DEP’T INTERIOR, supra note 55 (noting that, to apply for a 
BLM grazing permit, one must either: “Buy or control private property known as base property 
(property that has been legally recognized by the BLM as having preference for the use of public land 
grazing privileges),” or “Acquire property that has the capability to serve as base property and then 
apply to the BLM to transfer the preference for grazing privileges from an existing base property to the 
acquired property (this would become the new base property).”). 
 72. See id. (grazing permits or leases can be obtained by buying or leasing base properties that “has 
been legally recognized by the BLM as having preference for the use of public land grazing privileges” 
or by acquiring “property that has the capability to serve as base property and then apply[ing] to the 
BLM to transfer the preference for grazing privileges from an existing base property to the acquired 
property,” which would become the new base property). 
 73. See L. Allen Torell & John P. Doll, Public Land Policy and the Value of Grazing Permits, 16 
W. J. AGRIC. ECON. 174 (1991). It is not uncommon for a western ranch to be comprised of a small 
amount of deeded private land, perhaps less than 640 acres, and a significantly larger amount of public 
land, often several thousands of acres, to which the rancher holds federal grazing privileges and can use 
and manage along with the private land. 
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settlers, or owners of water or water rights.”74 This requirement that grazing permit 
holders must own or lease livestock remains in place today. Moreover, permits 
were initially allocated based on prior use of the public rangelands. Priority was 
granted to those ranchers who had demonstrated a recent history of grazing on the 
open range from 1929 to 1934 and to those who owned land or water.75 
The Act also states that grazing permits “shall not create any right, title, 
interest, or estate in or to” the public grazing allotments, but it also notes that 
“grazing privileges recognized and acknowledged shall be adequately 
safeguarded.”76 This tension has led to a longstanding debate over whether ranchers 
have semi-formal grazing rights to public rangelands or merely grazing privileges 
that can be reduced or revoked without compensation. Indeed, the Act mentions 
only grazing “privileges,” not formal rights, and states that the secretary of the 
interior can specify “from time to time numbers of stock and seasons of use.”77 
Public land agencies insist that grazing permits do not represent an actual property 
right, and various court rulings have generally affirmed that grazing privileges do 
not confer a formal right.78 
Nonetheless, in many important ways, federal grazing permits function as 
property rights in practice. For example, permits often have significant economic 
value, which is capitalized into the value of a ranch’s base property. Banks 
collateralize loans to ranchers based on the value of the permits, and federal capital 
gains and estate tax calculations reflect their value.79 Moreover, ranchers own and 
are responsible for any improvements made on public rangelands such as fences, 
water pipelines, and wells. In effect, even though courts and public land agencies 
have treated grazing on federal allotments as mere privileges, such permits have 
been treated as a right in practice.80 This debate over grazing rights or privileges is 
at the core of many of today’s conflicts over the use of federal rangelands, as 
various environmental laws and regulations have resulted in agencies seeking to 
reduce or eliminate livestock grazing on many public grazing allotments at the 
expense of traditional grazing rights.81 
 
 74. 43 U.S.C. § 315b (2012). 
 75. See LIBECAP, supra note 44, at 49. 
 76. 43 U.S.C. § 315b (2012). 
 77. Id. 
 78. Id.; see also 36 C.F.R. § 222.3(b) (2018) (noting that U.S. Forest Service grazing permits 
“convey no right, title, or interest held by the United States in any lands or resources.”). 
 79. See Torell & Doll, supra note 73; see also Frank J. Falen & Karen Budd-Falen, The Right to 
Graze Livestock on the Federal Lands: The Historical Development of Western Grazing Rights, 30 
IDAHO L. REV. 505, 523 (1994); Leigh Raymond, Are Grazing Rights on Public Lands a Form of 
Private Property?, 50 J. RANGE MGMT. 431, 433 (1997). 
 80. See Falen & Budd-Falen, supra note 79, at 506 (noting that “according to both Forest Service 
and BLM policy, a grazing preference is a mere privilege and is revocable at will. On the other hand, 
many ranchers consider their preference to be an equitable estate, a type of property right”); id. at 523 
(noting that the Internal Revenue Service taxes grazing permits as a property right). 
 81. See Shawn Regan, Managing Conflicts over Western Rangelands, 54 PERC POL’Y SERIES 1, 5, 
16 (2016) (discussing property-rights of federal grazing policy and recent conflicts over grazing, noting 
that the amount of grazing authorized on BLM land is half of what it was in 1954, in part driven by 
these environmental pressures). 
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Whether conferring rights or privileges, the institutions governing grazing 
on federal lands are based on the notion of “use” for the purpose of livestock 
grazing. While other laws, such the Federal Land Policy and Management Act 
(FLPMA)82 and the Public Rangelands Improvement Act (PRIA),83 have expanded 
other recognized uses of public grazing lands to include environmental and 
recreational values, as well as mandated federal land planning procedures, this 
fundamental fact remains. To acquire or maintain valid permits to public grazing 
allotments, permittees must be in the business of grazing livestock. If permittees 
abandon grazing on a significant portion of an allotment, the BLM could transfer 
the permit to another rancher willing to use the allotment for livestock grazing.84 
The overall effect of these various federal policies is a system of grazing 
management that restricts who can hold the rights and what those rights can be 
used for. In practice, the system is based on the continued use of forage resources 
(grass, shrubs, and other vegetation) on public rangelands for the purpose of 
feeding domestic livestock. Other uses of forage are not permitted under current 
grazing policy. 
Such a system clearly creates barriers for groups or individuals seeking to 
acquire grazing permits for non-use purposes. Thus, resolving conflicting demands 
over public rangelands through market mechanisms, such as purchasing use rights 
for non-use purposes, is largely prohibited within federal grazing laws. With few 
exceptions, conservation groups often have no direct mechanism for obtain grazing 
permits from ranchers and choosing not to graze the public rangelands or retiring 
the grazing permits altogether. These barriers to conservation purchases of federal 
grazing permits are summarized below: 
Use it or lose it: A core assumption of federal grazing policy is that 
public-land grazing permits will be held by ranchers and used for the purpose of 
grazing domestic livestock. Allotments may be rested for short periods of time, but 
grazing cannot be abandoned altogether.85 In this sense, the policy is “use it or lose 
it.” If permittees do not graze at or near the level authorized under the terms and 
conditions of the federal grazing permit, the permits may be transferred to another 
qualifying rancher who will make use of the allotment for livestock grazing.86 This 
requirement poses obvious barriers to conservation groups seeking to acquire 
permits for non-use purposes.87 
 
 82. 43 U.S.C. §§ 1751-1753 (2012). 
 83. 43 U.S.C. §§ 1901-08 (2012). 
 84. Leshy & McUsic, supra note 60, at 371-72 (“under current law and policy, there is a serious 
risk that, if the conservation buyer relinquishes the permits, the federal land manager may allow other 
ranchers to expand their operations by putting their livestock on these federal lands”). 
 85. 43 C.F.R. § 4140.1 (2006). Under BLM regulations, grazing permittees are prohibited from 
“failing to make substantial grazing use as authorized by a permit or lease for 2 consecutive fee years,” 
subject to civil penalties. See also April Reese, The Big Buyout, HIGH COUNTRY NEWS (Apr. 4, 2005), 
https://www.hcn.org/issues/295/15398 (describing attempts to buy out grazing permits and provisions to 
rest allotments for certain periods of time). 
 86. See Leshy & McUsic, supra note 60, at 371-72. 
 87. Efforts to reform grazing laws to remove the use-it-or-lose-it requirements have thus far been 
unsuccessful. In 1994, then-Interior Secretary Bruce Babbitt proposed a set of rangeland reforms that 
would allow the secretary to issue grazing permits for “conservation use.” Id. at 52. The provision 
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The livestock-ownership requirement: A related barrier is the requirement 
that grazing permits be limited to those in the livestock business. The provision is 
based on the Taylor Grazing Act’s requirement that permits be issued to “bona fide 
settlers, residents, and other stock growers,” with preference given to those 
“engaged in the livestock business.”88 Conservation groups seeking to acquire 
grazing permits for non-grazing purposes would thus not qualify for such permits, 
even if it they were to acquire them. 
The base-property requirement: The requirement that permit holders must 
also own or control a qualifying base property creates additional challenges for 
conservationists. Even if a conservation group could obtain non-use rights to a 
grazing permit, the permit would only be valid if the group also controlled the 
rights to a qualifying base property, as determined by the BLM. This requirement 
can significantly raise the costs of acquiring non-use rights.89 
Incomplete and insecure grazing rights: The federal government’s refusal 
to formalize grazing permits as property rights instead of a mere “privilege” results 
in a lack of well-defined and secure property rights to forage resources on public 
lands. Rather than allocating formal forage rights to a certain amount of forage 
resources on public rangelands and allowing those rights to be traded to their 
highest-valued uses, federal grazing policy provides weak access privileges to 
public rangelands for a certain form of consumptive use and places restrictions on 
transfers to other uses. This reality undermines market trades that could better 
allocate forage resources to higher-valued uses, even for non-consumptive 
environmental purposes.90 Although this means that grazing privileges can be 
readily reduced or eliminated through legal or administrative means in response to 
environmental concerns or to comply with environmental statutes, it creates 
barriers to trading for non-consumptive purposes, which in many cases may be a 
cost-effective and efficient option for conservationists seeking to preserve natural 
amenities on federal rangelands.91 If rights were secure and well defined, ranchers 
could stand to benefit from allowing trades with environmental groups to occur.92 
 
would have allowed permit holders to remove livestock for the full term of the permit (typically ten 
years). Courts ultimately struck down the provision, arguing that it violated the Taylor Grazing Act. 
 88. 43 U.S.C. § 315b (2012). 
 89. Even if a conservation group sought to acquire the rights to a portion of a federal grazing 
permit—perhaps a sensitive riparian area or an upland meadow for the benefit of wildlife habitat—they 
would encounter these and other barriers. In particular, obtaining forage rights to even a limited area of 
a federal grazing allotment would require the group to also acquire qualifying base property in the area, 
a requirement that undoubtedly raises the costs of such a mutually beneficial potential transfer. See 
Robert H. Nelson, How to Reform Grazing Policy: Creating Forage Rights on Federal Rangelands, 8 
FORDHAM ENVTL. L.J. 645, 675 (1997). 
 90. See Lorraine M. Egan & Myles J. Watts, Some Costs of Incomplete Property Rights with 
Regard to Federal Grazing Permits, 74 LAND ECON. 171, 171-85 (1998) (noting that “[i]f the rights to 
grazing permits were secure and transferable, then the grazing permits [sic] values would not decrease in 
value as non-commercial uses become more desired” and providing evidence that the opposite has in 
fact. As non-commercial, environmental “uses” have become more valued, grazing permit values have 
declined, due to the incomplete and insecure nature of federal grazing permits). 
 91. As several prominent environmental leaders have acknowledged, direct acquisition of grazing 
permits may in fact be a more practical and effective conservation strategy to ensure environmental 
protections on federal rangelands than traditional political or legal strategies pursued by many 
environmental groups. Conservationist Andy Kerr, for instance, has argued that purchasing grazing 
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The barriers described above have the potential to thwart any number of 
trades that could establish non-use rights to rangelands to help resolve conflicting 
demands over federal rangelands.93 Yet, as a result of these barriers, more often 
than not conflicts over rangeland management are carried out through political or 
legal means, rather than through direct exchange. Nonetheless, there are important 
examples of conservation groups seeking to acquire—and in some cases 
successfully purchasing and holding—grazing permits for non-grazing purposes. 
These examples, discussed below, illustrate the practical challenges that such 
barriers impose to establishing non-use rights and provide evidence that, absent 
such barriers, grazing or forage-use rights could in many cases be acquired 
effectively for conservation-oriented non-use purposes.94 
A. Grand Canyon Trust 
Conservationists have long sought to protect the environmental or 
recreational amenities and values of certain tracts of public land. Such efforts often 
occur in or near areas with additional protections, such as national parks and 
monuments. One such area is the Grand Staircase-Escalante National Monument, 
which was set aside by President Bill Clinton in 1996. Like many other national 
monument designations, it allowed for the continued use of the monument by 
ranchers that held valid grazing permits prior to its designation.95 
The Grand Canyon Trust, a conservation group, has attempted to negotiate 
grazing buyouts with these and other permit holders in the region since 1996.96 
Between 1999 and 2001, the group spent $1.5 million to purchase base properties 
with public-land grazing permits for about 350,000 acres in and near the national 
 
rights would be an “easier” and “more just” approach. See Andrew Kerr, Removing Hoofed Locusts 
from the Public Trough, WILLOWA COUNTY CHIEFTAN, Aug. 15, 1996; Nelson, supra note 89, at 650-
54. Other leading conservationists such as Johanna Wald, former attorney for the Natural Resources 
Defense Council, and Dave Foreman, founder of the environmental group Earth First, have also 
advocated grazing buyouts as a pragmatic approach to achieving conservation objectives on federal 
rangelands. See id. at 655-56 (describing Wald and Foreman’s support for buyouts); see also Dave 
Foreman, Around the Campfire, 5 WILD EARTH 3 (1995) (“The butting-head battles with ranchers over 
grazing in Wilderness is bad news for all involved. The most practical and fairest way to end grazing in 
Wilderness is to buy ‘em out’”). 
 92. See Nelson, supra note 89 (proposing the creation of secure “forage rights” on federal 
rangelands that could be transferred for non-grazing purposes). 
 93. The debate over wild horses occupying federal rangelands is yet another example. See Vanessa 
Elizondo et al., You Can’t Drag Them Away: An Economic Analysis of the Wild Horse and Burro 
Program, 41 J. AGRIC. & RESOURCE ECON. 1, 18 (2016) (noting that allowing wild-horse advocacy 
groups to acquire federal grazing permits for the purpose of supporting wild horses “would involve 
fundamental changes in the structure and provisions of federal grazing leases.”). 
 94. The following cases draw from and expand upon Regan, supra note 81. 
 95. Gerhard Peters & John T. Woolley, William J. Clinton: Proclamation 6920—Establishment of 
the Grand Staircase-Escalante National Monument, THE AM. PRESIDENCY PROJECT (Sep. 18, 1996), 
http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/?pid=51948 
[https://web.archive.org/web/20180119021149/http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/?pid=51948]. 
 96. Conservation Group Buys Large Grand Staircase Grazing Allotment, ARIZ. DAILY SUN (Nov. 
27, 2001), https://azdailysun.com/conservation-group-buys-large-grand-staircase-grazing-allotment/
article_97da725c-ce3d-57ea-b093-423e1c7bd6b3.html. 
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monument.97 The group considered the properties and their associated federal 
grazing allotment to be important areas worthy of protection from the impacts of 
grazing, and thus they sought to purchase the base properties for non-use purposes. 
The Trust’s efforts were complicated due to the use-it-or-lose-it 
requirements of federal grazing policy.98 The grazing permit that came along with 
the properties required the group to maintain cattle on the allotment or risk losing 
the permits. Originally, the Trust offered to relinquish the grazing permits to the 
BLM if the agency declared the allotments closed as part of its land-use plan.99 But 
soon other ranchers applied to the BLM to have the grazing permits transferred to 
them instead since the Trust had no intent to graze. When that happened, the Trust 
opted to purchase the minimum number of cattle to graze on the allotment in order 
to retain control of the grazing permits.100 
This example illustrates the challenges imposed by the use-it-or-lose-it 
requirements associated with federal grazing permits. Current grazing rules prevent 
ranchers from trading permits to environmental groups who do not intend to run 
livestock on the land. And because the base-property requirement attaches grazing 
permits to specific ranches, the cost for environmental groups to acquire such base 
properties is increased if the grazing permit values are capitalized into the ranch 
property value. Such requirements clearly raise the costs of trading for groups that 
want to use rangelands for purposes other than grazing. 
B. American Prairie Reserve 
Other conservation groups have been able to work within existing federal 
grazing policies to accomplish their conservation objectives. As the example of the 
American Prairie Reserve (APR) illustrates, however, such trading can only be 
accomplished under specific circumstances due to the constraints of the federal 
grazing system. 
APR is a large-scale private conservation project seeking to protect and 
restore the prairies of eastern Montana, an ecosystem that has long been impacted 
by agricultural and ranching operations.101 The group aims to acquire private 
ranches in the region along with the associated federal grazing permits to create a 
landscape-scale conservation area larger than Yellowstone National Park.102 In 
contrast to many other U.S. environmental groups, APR seeks to accomplish its 
mission by directly purchasing private lands and the associated public-land grazing 
permits from ranchers, rather than through litigation or political processes. 
APR acquires private base properties and restores the land back to the 
prairie landscape that once prevailed across much of the West.103 Once the group 
 
 97. Joe Baird, Activists Win Fight on Rights to Grazing, SALT LAKE TRIB., Jan. 31, 2006. 
 98. See Leshy & McUsic, supra note 60, at 385-88. 
 99. See id. 
 100. See id. The Trust also formed a livestock-owning subsidiary to hold the grazing permits. See id. 
at 382. 
 101. For a related, in-depth discussion of American Prairie Reserve, see James L. Huffman, 
American Prairie Reserve: Protecting Wildlife Habitat on a Grand Scale 59 NAT. RESOURCES J. 35 
(2019). 
 102. Karl Puckett, Prairie Reserve Still Attracting Fans, Foes, GREAT FALLS TRIB., June 18, 2015. 
 103. Huffman, supra note 101. 
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acquires base properties, they often tear down ranch buildings, pull up fences, and 
remove the cattle herds that have dominated the landscape for the last century. In 
place of the cattle, APR seeks to restore the wild bison herds as well as other 
wildlife species.104 Today, APR owns or leases nearly 400,000 acres (about 92,000 
acres of deeded and 308,000 acres of public grazing leases) in the region and 
maintains a herd of more than 600 genetically pure wild bison.105 
Throughout the region, federal grazing allotments are interspersed with 
large private ranches, often in a scattered checkerboard of land tenure. This fact can 
complicate landscape-scale conservation efforts, which aim to protect vast areas in 
which wildlife species such as bison can roam freely. The existence of federal 
grazing allotments means that APR must navigate the BLM’s grazing policies to 
accomplish their conservation objectives. In particular, the group must be able to 
acquire base properties and the associated grazing permits without being forced to 
graze cattle on the federal allotments. 
APR is able to do so due to a fortunate fact: The group’s bison herd, 
which is privately owned by APR, is considered a class of livestock and therefore 
satisfies the BLM’s livestock-grazing requirements. When APR acquires a base 
property with a public grazing allotment, the group applies to the BLM to change 
the class of livestock so that bison can graze the allotment instead of cattle.106 Once 
the BLM approves the livestock change, APR is able to maintain control over 
grazing allotments without being forced, as the Grand Canyon Trust was, to graze 
cattle on the land. APR can also request to change the allotment grazing season to 
year-round grazing.107 In some cases, APR is also permitted to remove interior 
fencing within the allotments so they can manage their private lands along with the 
public lands as one common pasture.108 
The example of the American Prairie Reserve, while thus far largely 
successful, reveals a fundamental obstacle to adopting similar conservation 
approaches elsewhere. The use-it-or-lose-it requirement for federal grazing permits 
limits the type and scope of conservation work that can be accomplished through 
private land transactions and grazing permit transfers. 
Consider how a similar group might attempt to replicate APR’s model in a 
place like Nevada. Suppose that instead of protecting bison habitat the group 
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sought to create a landscape-scale conservation project to protect desert tortoises. 
The group would purchase private ranches and leverage the associated public 
grazing rights to protect wildlife habitat. Under current grazing rules, however—
specifically the requirement to graze livestock or lose the permit—a private 
conservation project such as this would likely not be possible. While in APR’s 
case, bison can be considered livestock, a conservation group in Nevada would 
have a much more difficult time making the case that desert tortoises qualify as 
livestock. 
The APR model is feasible within the existing federal grazing system, but 
it is unlikely that this approach is scalable to other regions or other species. Given 
their particular interest in bison conservation, a group like APR may find continued 
success within existing federal grazing laws, but the ability of other groups to 
replicate their success in other contexts is limited. 
C. Voluntary Retirements and Permit Buyouts 
What about ranchers who voluntarily relinquish their grazing permits in 
exchange for compensation from a third-party environmental group? There are, in 
fact, several ways this can occur to facilitate grazing-permit buyouts, but only 
under certain limited circumstances: 1) A federal land agency agrees to “retire” the 
allotment from livestock grazing through administrative processes, or 2) Congress 
passes special legislation that explicitly enables voluntary grazing permit 
retirements in a region, often as part of the creation of a wilderness area or other 
public-land designation. 
The first option—retiring an allotment through administrative means—is 
one possible mechanism to enable the acquisition of grazing permits for non-use 
purposes, but it is not without considerable challenges. Conservation groups could, 
for instance, acquire a grazing permit from a rancher and request that the federal 
land management agency retire the permit from future use. And indeed, federal 
land agencies have broad authority to retire grazing permits under various land-use 
planning processes.109 Yet such actions are limited in duration and are easily 
reversible, thus providing little or no certainty that the allotments will remain 
unused.110 If an agency “retires” a permit, they can do so for only ten or fifteen 
years by amending the area’s resource management plan to reallocate the allotment 
to wildlife and watershed protection. Federal law requires such plans to be 
regularly reviewed, at which point the allotment could be reopened to grazing.111 
Likewise, the secretary of the interior can also “withdraw” certain federal lands 
from livestock grazing under FLPMA, but such withdrawals are likewise limited in 
duration and easily revoked.112 Only Congress can permanently retire a grazing 
allotment.113 
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The second way to retire a grazing permit is through Congressional 
legislation that explicitly authorizes the retirement. This option provides more 
certainty that the allotment will remain unused, but it is likewise limited in scope 
and difficult to obtain. In short, Congress will occasionally pass legislation 
pertaining to a particular region, often establishing a wilderness designation or 
similar public-land protection, and include provisions allowing grazing permit 
holders to voluntarily retire their permits. For instance, the Sawtooth National 
Recreation Area and Jerry Peak Wilderness Additions Act, signed into law in 2015, 
allows some ranchers with federal grazing permits within the wilderness 
boundaries to voluntarily retire their permits and receive compensation from a 
third-party conservation group.114 Such legislation is rare, however, and is region-
specific. 
Despite such challenges, these options have enabled voluntary grazing 
permit buyouts to occur on a limited basis in certain areas in the western United 
States. In 1996, for instance, Congress amended the law that established Great 
Basin National Park to allow grazing permit holders in the park to voluntarily 
relinquish and retire their permits.115 Three permit holders agreed to donate their 
permits back to the park in exchange for compensation from several conservation 
groups.116 
Various conservation groups have purchased grazing permits from 
ranchers and sought to retire them using these mechanisms with mixed results.117 
As one example, WildEarth Guardians, a nonprofit environmental organization, is 
pursuing a voluntary buyout strategy to protect grazing allotments in the Gila 
National Forest of New Mexico. According to Bryan Bird, a former director of the 
group responsible for the buyout effort, the strategy represents “a free-market 
approach” to the longstanding confrontation between environmental groups and 
ranchers, particularly in light of the reintroduction of Mexican gray wolves in the 
region in 1998.118 The wolves are a federally protected species, but they often kill 
livestock and create acrimony between ranchers and conservationists.119 
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WildEarth Guardian’s buyout program works as follows: The group 
negotiates a private agreement with a rancher to buy out their grazing permit. 
WildEarth Guardians then approaches the USFS to request retirement of the 
grazing allotment. The USFS evaluates the proposal and decides what to do with 
the grazing permit. WildEarth Guardians does not own the grazing permit.120 
This buyout approach is a tenuous process, and success has been limited. 
The USFS has traditionally been reluctant to retire allotments.121 WildEarth 
Guardians acknowledges that the agency could simply issue the grazing permit to 
another rancher—a function of the use-it-or-lose-it principle governing federal 
rangeland management.122 In two cases, however, USFS officials with the Gila 
National Forest have approved temporary retirements of a grazing permit 
purchased by WildEarth Guardians.123 
Elsewhere in the United States, environmental groups have pursued 
similar buyout strategies to resolve livestock-wildlife conflicts. Since 2001, the 
National Wildlife Federation has secured more than half a million acres of federal 
grazing land outside Yellowstone National Park to protect habitat for bison, grizzly 
bears, and wolves.124 The group does so by negotiating voluntary buyouts with 
ranchers and relying on federal land agencies to retire the allotments, albeit with 
limited security that the allotments will remain unused.125 As one example, 
Montana rancher Rick Jarrett had a permit to graze cattle on 8,000 acres in the 
Gallatin National Forest, but his livestock operation was increasingly threatened by 
growing populations of grizzly bears and wolves. The National Wildlife Federation 
offered to purchase Jarrett’s grazing permit, and the USFS, in this case, agreed to 
retire the permit to alleviate wildlife conflicts on the allotment.126 
D. Grazing Leases on State Trust Lands 
One area where conservation groups have had at least some success 
acquiring non-use grazing rights is on state trust lands. This unique class of land—
owned and administered by states under trust management principles—provides 
several examples of how non-use rights, if permitted, can be directly acquired to 
resolve shifting demands over the use of natural resources. Yet, despite limited 
successes, the experience of state trust lands also illustrates several persistent 
challenges that nonetheless often impede the emergence of such rights. 
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State trust lands were granted by Congress to states at statehood for the 
purpose of supporting common schools and other public institutions, beginning 
with Ohio in 1803 and ending with Alaska in 1959.127 Trust lands were granted in 
square-mile sections, ranging from one to four square miles per township, 
depending upon the state. Today, these lands comprise approximately 46 million 
acres, most of which are located in western states and are often scattered in a 
checkerboard-like fashion across the landscape.128 
Compared to other federal and state land institutions, state trust lands have 
a distinguishing feature: The lands are held in a perpetual, intergenerational trust 
for the long-term benefit of a variety of beneficiaries, primarily public schools but 
also universities, hospitals, and other public institutions.129 In practice, this 
fiduciary trust responsibility generally means that states are obligated to manage 
trust lands for the financial benefit of trust beneficiaries by earning fair market 
value from the use of trust lands and maximizing revenues earned from the 
lands.130 Throughout their history, western states have generally attempted to 
satisfy this trust mandate by leasing trust lands for resource-development purposes, 
including grazing.131 
The requirement that trust managers must maximize revenues and obtain 
fair-market value has served as a basis upon which conservation groups have 
attempted to acquire legal non-use rights to state grazing leases. Since the mid-
1990s, environmental groups have bid on grazing leases in Arizona, New Mexico, 
Idaho, Montana, and Oregon.132 By outbidding ranchers, the groups have attempted 
to use states’ revenue-maximization obligations to compel trust managers to award 
them the leases, even if they were to be used for conservation purposes instead of 
grazing. This has resulted in several legal challenges.133 
The conservationists’ arguments were straightforward: If states are 
required to manage trust lands solely for the long-term benefit of trust 
beneficiaries, then denying high-bidding environmental groups would be a 
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violation of a state’s trust responsibilities.134 In this sense, the argument goes, trust 
land managers should generally be ambivalent about whether the highest-valued 
use of a state trust lease is for livestock grazing or for conservation purposes, as 
long as it maximizes revenue for trust beneficiaries. Such arguments were 
nonetheless regularly challenged by state officials, with most states initially 
rejecting bids from environmental groups on the basis that the trust managers 
should also consider factors such as the stability of the livestock industry, the 
broader economic effect of displacing ranchers, and the foregone tax revenues 
generated by the livestock industry.135 Environmental groups routinely filed suit in 
response.136 
The results have been mixed. In 1995, the environmental group Forest 
Guardians bid on and received state grazing leases in New Mexico.137 In 1997, the 
group bid on two leases in Arizona—a 5,000-acre parcel for which they offered 
twice the amount that the previous lessee offered, and a 162-acre lease for which 
the group offered five times as much as the previous lessee.138 Since the group had 
no intention of grazing the leases, the Arizona State Land Department rejected the 
applications, arguing that Forest Guardians should first seek to have the leases 
reclassified from grazing to commercial use and then attempt to bid.139 In 2001, the 
Arizona Supreme Court held that the state must consider Forest Guardian’s bids, 
regardless of whether they sought to graze the land or not, based on the state’s 
fiduciary trust responsibilities.140 Despite the court victory, the case remains 
controversial among the ranching community and led to legislative efforts to 
reduce competition on state grazing leases.141 Today, few non-use lease 
acquisitions have occurred in Arizona. 
Another case involving the environmental group Idaho Watersheds Project 
(IWP) illustrates similar challenges.142 In 1994, IWP was the high bidder on a 
grazing lease, yet Idaho’s State Board of Land Commissioners awarded the lease to 
a rancher instead.143 IWP successfully appealed the decision, prompting the state 
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land board to hold a second auction. Again, IWP outbid the rancher, this time by a 
factor of 200, yet the state still awarded the lease to the rancher.144 The group filed 
suit to challenge the land board’s decisions. In response, the state’s legislature 
revised its statutes governing grazing leases applications to stack the deck in favor 
of livestock lessees and then attempted to amend the state constitution to eliminate 
the auction requirement for grazing leases.145 
Such cases have resulted in several legal challenges in which courts 
addressed several key questions, such as whether state trust land boards can 
consider other factors such as the state’s general economy or the livestock industry 
when leasing trust lands. The Idaho Supreme Court has ruled that the state cannot 
consider such broad factors, interpreting the state’s duty as a trustee to require that 
its trust lands are leased solely for the benefit of the trust beneficiaries, public 
schools.146 In 2000, IWP was awarded its first grazing lease for non-grazing use, 
and environmental groups have acquired several others since then.147 The fight over 
leasing trust lands to environmental bidders in Idaho still remains a subject of much 
legal controversy.148 
Although significant obstacles remain for environmental bidders on trust 
lands, the primary obstacle is not a lack of financial resources to acquire the 
permits but rather the legal and political barriers to acquiring non-use rights.149 
Overall, however, trust lands present an interesting case in the evolution of non-use 
rights to natural resources. Despite their revenue-generating mandate, they have 
arguably been more accommodating of non-use rights to grazing leases than their 
counterparts in federal land agencies. Moreover, the experience of trust lands 
demonstrates a willingness and ability of groups to directly acquire non-use rights 
to some state lands that were previously used for grazing purposes. Nonetheless, 
even though trust land managers have a fiduciary responsibility to ensure fair-
market value and maximum economic returns from trust lands, land managers have 
often been reluctant to uphold that mandate when doing so would allocate rights for 
non-use purposes. 
5. OIL AND GAS 
The U.S. Bureau of Land Management (BLM) oversees energy 
development on the subsurface of vast amounts of federal land, primarily in the 
western United States. Altogether, these underground resources span more than 700 
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million onshore acres.150 Approximately 113 million acres of onshore federal lands 
are open and accessible for oil and gas development, and about 166 million acres 
are off limits or inaccessible.151 Production of oil and natural gas from these lands 
represent significant sources of federal and state revenues and make up 21 percent 
of U.S. oil production and 16 percent of U.S. natural gas.152 In 2015, 32.2 million 
acres were under lease, of which about 12.8 million acres were in production.153 
The BLM manages oil and gas development by leasing parcels of federal 
land to energy developers, who then develop the resources under certain lease 
terms and conditions. This authority comes from two laws: the Mineral Leasing 
Act of 1920154 and the Mineral Leasing Act of 1947.155 The process works as 
follows: Members of the public, typically energy companies, nominate parcels of 
public land that they wish to lease. Before the parcels are offered for lease, the 
BLM reviews the proposed leases to ensure compliance with the area’s Resource 
Management Plans, and other factors such as environmental concerns, prior to 
making the lands available for leasing.156 
Leases are either competitive or noncompetitive. The Federal Onshore Oil 
and Gas Leasing Reform Act of 1987 requires that leases must first be offered by 
competitive leasing.157 Only after the agency has offered leases competitively at 
auction can the leases then be offered noncompetitively.158 Competitive and 
noncompetitive leases are issued for 10-year periods at quarterly BLM lease sale 
auctions. The BLM states that winning bidders must submit “a properly executed 
lease bid form, which constitutes a legally binding lease offer, and pay an 
administrative fee, the first year’s advance rental ($1.50 per acre or fraction 
thereof), and not less than a $2-per-acre minimum bonus bid.”159 Leases expire at 
the end of the 10-year primary term; however, the BLM may extend leases if 
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drilling operations are in progress or if the lease contains a well capable of 
producing in paying quantities.160 The BLM may cancel non-producing leases that 
fail to comply with lease terms.161 
The expenses associated with maintaining a federal oil and gas lease 
include bonds, rents, and royalties. Before drilling, companies must provide the 
BLM a bond of at least $10,000 to ensure compliance with all lease terms, 
including environmental provisions.162 Annual rental rates for competitive and 
noncompetitive leases are $1.50 per acre for the first 5 years of the lease and $2.00 
per acre for each year thereafter.163 The federal government also charges a 12.5 
percent royalty rate on oil and gas extracted from federal lands.164 
Because many federal lands containing oil and gas resources 
simultaneously provide significant environmental and recreational values as well, 
controversies frequently occur over energy development on public lands. 
Importantly for the theme of this paper, the laws and regulations governing oil and 
gas leasing on federal lands present largely insurmountable challenges for 
environmental groups or individuals seeking to directly acquire non-use rights to 
energy resources on federal lands. Instead, conflicting demands over federal land 
use are fought through political or legal channels rather than being resolved 
through market mechanisms. Lease sales are often formally protested or litigated 
by environmental groups, for instance, with varying degrees of success in terms of 
delayed or cancelled sales.165 
An examination of the laws governing federal energy leasing reveals that 
the challenges of resolving conflicts over energy development on federal lands are 
not due simply to a lack of interest among environmental groups or individuals in 
acquiring such leases for non-use purposes. Nor is it often due to a lack of financial 
resources to do so. As the following case studies demonstrate, several groups and 
individuals have attempted to acquire federal energy leases for non-use, 
conservation purposes. For the most part, these efforts have been unsuccessful due 
to institutional barriers that prohibit such non-use acquisitions. Even so, under 
special circumstances that are explored below, some conservation groups have 
indeed successfully acquired non-use rights to energy resources on federal lands, 
although such examples are a rare exception. Moreover, the case studies suggest 
that others would likely seek to acquire such rights if the rules were amended to 
more easily allow non-use rights to energy resources to be acquired via market 
transactions. 
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A. ‘Keep it in the Ground’ Activists Bidding in Utah 
One high-profile case helps illustrate some of the key obstacles to 
acquiring non-use rights to federal energy leases. In 2008, Tim DeChristopher, an 
environmental activist and student at the University of Utah, entered a BLM oil and 
gas lease auction in southern Utah and promptly outbid developers on 14 lease 
parcels comprised of 22,500 acres for a total of $1.8 million.166 The bidding turned 
out to be bogus—simply a tactic to disrupt the auction and prevent the lease sale 
from going forward—and DeChristopher was arrested for making false statements. 
He was eventually sentenced to two years in prison.167 
Though the bidding was illegitimate, the example raised important 
questions: What if DeChristopher had bid in good faith? And what if he had, or 
could raise, the necessary funds to purchase the leases? The parcels sold at the 
auction for as little as $2.25 per acre in a scenic area near Moab outside of 
Canyonlands National Park, a region with high recreation and amenity values.168 
While other parcels sold for considerably higher amounts, the average price was 
$80 per acre, totaling 22,500 acres at $1.8 million. This price is a substantial 
amount, but hardly out of the reach of major environmental groups. In fact, when 
word got out about DeChristopher’s protest effort, he quickly raised $45,000 in 
donations, which was enough to cover the down payment required by the BLM for 
the leases.169 The episode begged the question: If DeChristopher had done the right 
things, would he have been able to hold the lease and choose not to develop the 
resources? 
In short, the answer is no. The laws and regulations governing energy 
development on federal lands require that oil and gas leaseholders must develop the 
energy resources on their parcels, otherwise their leases can be cancelled. This fact 
effectively prohibits environmentalists from acquiring and holding federal energy 
leases. In the end, DeChristopher’s bogus bids were rejected, and the auction’s 
results were ultimately cancelled.170 
A more legitimate effort helps further illustrate this reality. In 2016, Terry 
Tempest Williams, the well-known environmentalist author, pursued a similar 
strategy to protest a proposed energy lease sale in Utah. But unlike DeChristopher, 
Williams attempted to legally bid for two federal oil and gas leases in good faith, 
and with the necessary financial resources.171 Williams purchased two 
noncompetitive leases for $1,680 (plus a $820 processing fee) comprising 1,120 
acres near Arches National Park in southern Utah. Instead of developing the 
traditional energy resources beneath the parcels, Williams planned to use the land 
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to promote the burgeoning “Keep It in the Ground” activist movement, which seeks 
to prevent oil and gas resources from being extracted. To maintain the lease and 
establish herself as a legitimate energy company, Williams formed Tempest 
Exploration Company, LLC, and even began paying the annual rental fees 
associated with the lease. “We have every intention of complying with the law, 
even as we challenge it,” Williams later wrote in the New York Times.172 “We will 
pay the annual rent for the duration of the 10-year lease and keep whatever oil and 
gas lies beneath these lands in the ground.”173 
Williams’ efforts, however, did not work. The BLM eventually cancelled 
the lease and returned her payments, arguing that since she had expressed a clear 
intention not to develop the lease’s oil and gas resources, she was in violation of 
the BLM’s lease requirements.174 Specifically, the BLM argued Williams’ violated 
the “diligent development requirement” of the Mineral Leasing Act of 1920, which 
states that “lessees must exercise reasonable diligence in developing and 
producing” leased energy resources, “and must prevent unnecessary damage to, 
loss of, or waste of leased resources.”175 As the BLM wrote in a letter to Williams, 
citing her comments in the New York Times as evidence, “an expressed intent by a 
person offering to purchase a lease to not develop and produce the oil and gas 
resources on the leasehold would directly conflict with the diligent development 
requirement and require that the offer be rejected.”176 Thus, despite her efforts to 
comply with the leasing provisions, Williams was unable to hold a federal oil and 
gas permit if she had no intention of developing the energy resources. 
B. Leasing in Sage Grouse Habitat in Utah’s West Desert 
Due in part to the speculative nature of many federal oil and gas leases, 
parcels are often sold for relatively modest sums. In the case of the noncompetitive 
leases acquired by Terry Tempest Williams, for instance, the leasing rights to 1,120 
acres of federal land were purchased for just $1,680 (plus the small per-acre annual 
rental payments).177 The entire BLM auction that Williams bid on generated a total 
of $278,000 in lease sales—a relatively meager amount for 21 parcels totaling 
nearly 23,000 acres.178 Yet other leases have yielded even less. These sales often 
occur in areas with considerable environmental or recreation values, yet because 
current leasing rules prohibit conservation groups from directly acquiring lease 
rights, there are obvious missed opportunities to obtain non-use rights. 
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A recent lease sale in Utah’s West Desert provides further evidence that, if 
laws allowed it, conservation groups could afford to directly acquire certain federal 
energy leases with high conservation value. In 2017, the BLM conducted a sale of 
controversial leases in sage grouse habitat near Nephi, Utah, that yielded less than 
$15,000 in revenue for the federal government.179 Conservation groups, including 
the Center for Biological Diversity, Western Watersheds Project, Wilderness 
Society, and the National Audubon Society, had protested the sale over concerns 
about its impact on grouse habitat. The three parcels that sold attracted only the 
minimum bid of $2.00 per acre.180 
Given the considerable conservation value of the parcels, it is highly likely 
that the environmental groups that protested the sale could have successfully outbid 
energy developers for the leases in sage grouse habitat, if federal energy leasing 
rules allowed them to do so. Moreover, it is also likely that such groups spent more 
than $15,000 in resources formally protesting the leases, suggesting that a more 
efficient outcome would have been possible through direct market acquisition of 
the leases. Other recent federal energy lease sales—many of which are located in 
areas with high conservation, recreation, or other natural amenity values—have 
resulted in similar low bids.181 
C. Hoback Lease Buyout 
Although standard federal energy leasing rules preclude environmental 
groups from bidding for oil and gas leases, there are region-specific exceptions that 
have allowed conservation groups to purchase existing energy leases from willing 
sellers and retire the leases from future development. When such trades have been 
authorized, groups have organized to negotiate buyouts of energy leases in areas 
with high environmental and recreational value, in essence, acquiring the leases for 
non-use purposes. Such trades, however, are only possible with special legislation 
that explicitly enables the purchases to occur. 
In 2012, the Trust for Public Land (TPL), a nonprofit conservation group, 
bought out federal energy leases from the Plains Exploration and Production (PXP) 
Company on 58,000 acres of Wyoming’s Hoback Basin.182 The $8.75 million deal 
secured important environmental and recreational amenities in the region that could 
have been developed by PXP. The company had long held valid leases to drill up to 
136 natural gas wells on 17 well pads, despite opposition from 
environmentalists.183 TPL organized a fundraising campaign to raise the funds 
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necessary to purchase the leases, receiving donations from a variety of groups and 
donors interested in protecting the Hoback Basin. In 2013, the sale was 
completed.184 
The deal was only possible thanks to the Wyoming Range Legacy Act of 
2009.185 The Act withdrew 1.2 million acres of Bridger-Teton National Forest from 
future mineral leasing, but it did not affect valid existing lease rights, which 
included more than a dozen energy leases covering 120,000 acres.186 The Act also 
contained a provision that allowed groups to purchase mineral lease rights if the 
leases were voluntarily acquired by third-party groups from willing sellers.187 In 
exchange, the federal government would retire the leases from future 
development—in essence, setting up a market process for voluntary retirement of 
active energy leases. The Act, however, only applies to certain federal lands in 
Wyoming.188 
Similar energy-lease buyout deals have been proposed elsewhere but have 
ultimately failed due to a lack of supporting legislation. In 2012, the Thompson 
Divide Coalition sought to purchase existing federal energy leases on the 
Thompson Divide near Carbondale, Colorado, to protect the region’s scenic, high-
country lands from oil and gas development.189 The coalition originally offered to 
buy 220,000 acres of lease rights from the energy companies who held the leases 
for $2.5 million, an amount equal to what the companies paid when the leases were 
auctioned by the BLM a decade earlier.190 When that offer was rejected, the group 
later claimed it could raise as much as $50 million for the leases if necessary. 
“These leases aren’t a game-changer for the industry but are a significant game-
changer for our ranchers, hunters and communities,” the coalition’s director told 
the Denver Post. “We want to make companies whole on their investment — and 
preserve this area for hunters, ranchers and recreationists.”191 The coalition claimed 
that the economic value of preserving the land outweighed the value of the oil and 
gas that could be extracted.192 
To succeed, the Thompson Divide lease buyout would have required 
special legislation similar to the Wyoming Range Legacy Act that would permit the 
voluntary acquisition and retirement of federal energy leases in the region. In the 
 
 184. Hoback Drilling Leases Acquired from PXP, TRUST FOR PUB. LAND (Jan. 2, 2013), 
https://www.tpl.org/media-room/hoback-drilling-leases-acquired-
pxp#sm.0001ch500kl3segbsrc2e3y46zd37. 
 185. Id.; Wyoming Range Legacy Act, Omnibus Public Land Management Act of 2009, Pub. L. No. 
111-11, § 3201, 123 Stat. 1991 (2009). 
 186. Streater, supra note 182. 
 187. Wyoming Range Legacy Act, Omnibus Public Land Management Act of 2009 § 3201. 
 188. Id.; Scott Streater, Billionaire Funds Deal to Retire Wyo. Drilling Leases, E&E NEWS (Jul. 5, 
2018), https://www.eenews.net/stories/1060087925/print (In 2018, the Trust for Public Land struck a 
deal for a similar buyout and retirement of more than 24,000 acres of federal energy leases in 
Wyoming). 
 189. Bruce Finley, Colorado Ranchers, Sportsmen Propose Buy Back of Oil-Lease Land, DENV. 
POST (Nov. 14, 2012), https://www.denverpost.com/2012/11/14/colorado-ranchers-sportsmen-propose-
buy-back-of-oil-lease-land. 
 190. Id. 
 191. Id. 
 192. Id. 
166 NATURAL RESOURCES JOURNAL Vol. 59 
case of the Thompson Divide, however, such legislation did not pass, and the 
coalition’s proposed buyout never occurred.193 The controversy over drilling in the 
region simmered until November 2016, when the BLM cancelled 25 of the oil and 
gas leases in the Thompson Divide region during the waning days of the Obama 
administration.194 
6. TIMBER 
The U.S. Forest Service is responsible for managing 193 million acres of 
land in the United States, with most of its landholdings located in western states.195 
The agency’s mission is “to sustain the health, diversity, and productivity of the 
nation’s forests and grasslands to meet the needs of present and future 
generations.”196 Among the many diverse land uses that occur on national forests—
from recreation and livestock grazing to watershed protection and energy 
production—is commercial timber harvesting.197 According to the agency, 
approximately 73 percent of its lands are considered forested, and of that forested 
land, an estimated 35 percent is available for timber harvesting, with about 0.5 
percent being harvested in a given year.198 
National forests have traditionally been managed for multiple uses, with 
timber harvesting being a primary use. But increasingly, recreation and 
environmental concerns have become more prevalent.199 Today, in addition to 
timber harvesting and other forms of natural resource development, the USFS 
manages for wilderness, recreation, endangered species habitat, soil and forest 
health, ecological restoration, and other conservation purposes. Environmental 
protection has typically been accomplished through acts of Congress or through the 
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courts—for example, by designating wilderness areas, re-classifying lands as 
national parks and monuments, or by limiting certain forms of development or use 
for environmental purposes. Laws such as the Endangered Species Act,200 National 
Forest Management Act,201 and National Environmental Policy Act202 require the 
agency to account for the environmental impacts of the agency’s land management 
plans, often restricting certain forms of natural resource use, such as timber 
harvesting. 
Nonetheless, timber harvesting remains a significant component of 
national forest management. In 2016, the USFS harvested 2.5 million board feet of 
timber from national forests from more than 150,000 timber sales.203 The objective 
of timber management is “[t]o cultivate and maintain tree stands in a manner that 
promotes and achieves a diverse pattern of vegetation that best meets the needs of 
people now and in the future.”204 Other stated objectives include: to provide a 
continuous supply of timber for the use and necessities of U.S. citizens; to provide 
an even flow of timber “to facilitate the stabilization of communities and 
opportunities for employment”; “to manage and provide for regeneration of tree 
stands”; “to maintain a diversity of forest vegetation types and resources consistent 
with forest plans”; “to plan and conduct cost-effective timber sales”; and “to restore 
and maintain healthy forest conditions through the reduction of hazardous fuels.”205 
To conduct a timber sale, the USFS leases the rights to cut a stand of 
timber in a national forest at a competitive auction using either sealed bids or oral 
auctions.206 Prior to a sale, the agency appraises the value of the timber to be cut 
and provides the details of that appraisal to prospective bidders.207 Sales are made 
to private commercial timber companies, which then harvest timber according to 
the terms and conditions of the sale contract. The contract describes the area where 
harvesting can occur, the length of time that cutting is permitted, and the road 
building and replanting requirements that are necessary.208 The USFS establishes a 
minimum bid price based on the appraisal, and the contract is awarded to the 
highest bid that conforms to the conditions of the sale.209 
Importantly for this article, federal timber sale contracts are essentially 
“must-cut” contracts.210 Winning bidders are required to harvest timber within a 
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certain time period (not to exceed 10 years) in accordance with the terms of timber 
sale contract.211 If harvesting does not occur with this period, the contract may be 
cancelled. This must-cut requirement effectively precludes environmental groups 
from participating in the federal timber leasing process. 
This fact has led some observers to question the efficiency of the federal 
government’s must-cut provision. Economist Peter H. Nickerson, for instance, has 
noted that the “must-cut” requirement limits the emergence of markets for 
preservation on national forests.212 Nickerson argues for “an open market approach 
to old-growth timber” that would allow conservation groups to bid to protect timber 
stands that have important conservation or amenity value.213 “Allowing only 
harvesters of trees the right to bid on them implies that the cutting of the timber is 
the highest valued use of it,” writes Nickerson.214 “Removal of the must-cut 
specification from these contracts would allow the auction mechanism to generate 
the highest valued use of the timber, not merely the highest timber cutting 
value.”215 
The examples briefly described below provide some evidence that, at least 
in several important cases, markets could emerge to resolve conflicting demands 
over the use or non-use of forests managed by federal and state agencies—if the 
laws and institutions that governed those forests allowed it. Yet, in practice, such 
markets have been slow to emerge due to these barriers, and even when they have 
emerged (particularly at the state level), difficulties have often arisen due to the 
use-based structure of the laws and institutions that presumes that the rights will be 
used in a traditional form—namely to harvest rather than to protect timber. 
A. Okanogan National Forest Salvage Timber Sale 
Despite these challenges, some groups have tried to acquire non-use rights 
to federal timber leases. In 1996, the Northwest Ecosystem Alliance (NWEA), a 
nonprofit conservation organization that later became Conservation Northwest, was 
the high bidder for a timber sale in the Okanogan National Forest in Washington.216 
The group bid $28,875 for a 275-acre sale of salvage timber on Thunder Mountain 
after a wildfire had burned through the area.217 NWEA previously sought to halt 
timber sales through litigation and lobbying, but Congress had recently passed a 
temporary salvage timber bill that barred legal challenges or administrative appeals 
to stop the sale of timber damaged by fire or disease.218 So the group had to get 
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creative. Their bid on the Okanogan salvage timber sale marked the first time 
NWEA sought to preserve forest lands with a direct market transaction.219 
To raise the money, NWEA sent out mailers asking supporters to “adopt 
an acre” of federal forest land for $100 each.220 The effort generated more than 
$10,000 in donations. But in the end, it did not matter. NWEA’s bid was ultimately 
rejected by the USFS, and the contract was awarded to a logging company 
instead.221 The sale was part of the national forest’s land management plan, which 
in part was designed to provide timber to local mills. According to forest officials, 
if NWEA refused to log the area, the group’s bid would be rejected. “For any high 
bidder to come in and decide what to do with the land short-circuits . . . the Forest 
Service plan,” the USFS official in charge of the sale told High Country New at the 
time.222 
Similar attempts by environmental groups to bid on federal timber sales 
occurred in Arizona and New Mexico in the mid-1990s. In Arizona, the Southwest 
Center for Biodiversity (now called the Center for Biological Diversity), tried to 
bid on a 2,000-acre salvage timber sale in the Gila National Forest in New Mexico, 
proposing to leave the trees standing and plant new vegetation in the aftermath of a 
recent wildfire.223 The USFS declined to consider the bid. The agency also refused 
to accept the group’s high bid of $4,000 for a timber sale in the Coronado National 
Forest in Arizona.224 
B. Loomis State Forest 
Much like the USFS, states regularly conduct timber sales on trust lands to 
generate revenue for trust beneficiaries. Timber harvesting is an important revenue 
source for many state trust agencies, and because states have a relatively clear 
mandate to generate revenues from trust lands, they are less susceptible to the 
litigation, administrative appeals, and political controversy that has contributed to a 
decline in timber harvesting at the federal level.225 
Nonetheless, despite states’ mandate to maximize revenues, the trust 
mandate has enabled interesting market-like buyouts of timber harvest rights for 
non-use, conservation purposes. After the USFS rejected their bid on the salvage 
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timber sale in the Okanogan National Forest, NWEA spearheaded a similar effort 
to protect a large forest on nearby state trust lands in Washington.226 Unlike the 
Okanogan case, this effort succeeded. In 1999, a coalition of environmental groups 
led by NWEA bought the right not to cut timber on 25,000 acres of the Loomis 
State Forest for $13.1 million.227 The purchase protected the last remaining roadless 
area in the 2 million-acre forest, which has stunning mountain vistas and abundant 
wildlife, including important habitat for endangered Canada lynx and grizzly bears. 
The deal came about after NWEA and several other environmental groups 
sued the Washington Department of Natural Resources, claiming that its timber 
management plan violated water quality laws and the Endangered Species Act.228 
But because state trust lands are required to earn revenue to support the state’s 
public schools, there was little that could be done to halt the timber sale. Instead, 
NWEA negotiated a buyout deal with the state, in which the group, along with 
other supporters, would pay the state the fair market value of the standing timber to 
compensate the school trust for the foregone revenue it could have earned by 
selling the timber to logging companies. In exchange, the state would preserve the 
forest and the group would drop its lawsuit.229 In short time, a coalition of 70 
organizations and businesses raised the necessary funds from private individuals 
and foundations to compensate the state.230 The coalition also agreed to pay the 
state to purchase additional lands elsewhere that could be leased for logging for the 
benefit of the school trust fund. The deal marked the first time that such a transfer 
would be accomplished through private funds raised to compensate the school trust. 
Today, the state continues to own and manage the Loomis State Forest, which is 
open to the public for hiking, hunting, and other recreational uses, but the trees 
remain standing.231 
The state’s legal requirement to maximize economic returns to the school 
trusts, however, presented long-term challenges for the conservation-minded 
coalition that enabled the buyout of the Loomis forest. As part of the buyout 
agreement, the state reclassified the forest as a Natural Resource Conservation 
Area.232 As Samuel P. Hays explains, this change shifted the management of the 
forest “in a direction of multiple uses, much like the national forests, and the 
alliance found itself struggling to inject ecological objectives into the management 
program.”233 As a result, “the broad ecological goals of the Loomis purchase, 
including elimination of future wood harvest and road building, were threatened 
amid the intricate political maneuvering within the Department of Natural 
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Resources.”234 Still, the buyout is regarded as a success by NWEA (which is now 
Conservation Northwest), who call it a “landmark agreement” that fulfilled the 
state’s trust obligations while also protecting the forest as a state natural resource 
conservation area.235 
C. Montana’s Timber Conservation License in Lieu of Sale 
A recent controversial plan to cut timber on state lands near Bozeman, 
Montana, illustrates other practical challenges of acquiring non-use rights to public 
timber resources. In 2016, the Montana Department of Natural Resources and 
Conservation (DNRC) proposed a 730-acre timber sale on trust lands on Mount 
Ellis, just south of the town.236 The logging would be visible from much of the city 
and would negatively impact the viewshed of some neighborhoods at the foothills 
of the mountain. In response, local community groups formed to oppose the sale.237 
Montana law provides a means for such groups to acquire a form of non-
use timber harvest rights on trust lands by applying for a “timber conservation 
license in lieu of sale.”238 The license works as follows: During the environmental 
review process for a proposed timber sale, any person may request that the DNRC 
authorize a conservation license for the sale.239 The license would represent a 
temporary deferral of a timber harvest, or a portion of a harvest, over a specified 
geographic area. The department then prepares and recommends the timber sale for 
consideration by the state land board, using the alternatives of the sale with and 
without a conservation license included.240 Through this application process, 
conservation license applicants reserve the right to bid against logging companies 
during the bidding phase of the project. The department then solicits bids 
simultaneously for each alternative authorized to ensure that the full, fair-market 
value is secured for the trust beneficiaries.241 
In practice, the conservation license provision presents several challenges 
for the DNRC as well as prospective bidders: First, the DNRC is required to set the 
terms and length of the license as well as other provisions contained within it.242 
But how long should such a license apply? Would a winning conservation bidder 
compel the state to protect the area from logging for 5 years or 99 years? Or would 
the license apply only to the current generation of timber on the landscape, and 
how long should that be? The law provides no answers to these questions. Instead, 
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the DNRC must determine the length of a conservation license during the 
environmental review process, and such determinations are to be made on a case-
by-case basis.243 
This uncertainty creates obstacles for prospective non-use bidders. The 
duration of a conservation license, for instance, influences how much a group 
would be willing to bid for it. A license that is valid for only a few years is unlikely 
to garner a higher bid than a logging company would pay to harvest the timber 
crop, while one that ensures protection for a longer period could generate more 
interest among conservation bidders. For these reasons, the conservation license 
provision has rarely been used in Montana.244 In the case of the proposed timber 
sale near Bozeman, a local group has applied for a conservation license but has 
expressed a reluctance to bid for the license due to the unclear and potentially short 
duration of it.245 In August 2018, the DNRC’s draft environmental assessment for 
the Bozeman sale included a proposed action alternative that would offer a 
conservation license in lieu of a timber sale for a term of 10 years.246 
Other complications include the potential effects that a conservation 
license could have on the future value of the timber resource. In addition to 
determining the duration of a conservation license, the Montana DNRC studied the 
impacts associated with deferring the Bozeman timber sale for various lengths of 
time. These impacts could include a loss of timber value due to infestation, disease, 
price changes, or wildfire.247 In short, from the perspective of state trust managers 
responsible for maximizing financial returns from trust lands over the long run, a 
short-term conservation license could have lasting negative consequences for trust 
beneficiaries if it reduces the future value of the timber resource. 
7. WATER 
Surface water rights in the western United States provide a useful example 
of how institutions that initially developed to support extractive resource use can be 
adapted to accommodate private provision of non-use values. Traditionally, 
property rights could not be established for water left in stream under Western 
water law, but over the past 50 years most western states have implemented legal 
changes to create a basis for establishing environmental water rights. In principle, 
this system creates a vehicle for market-based provision of amenities values 
associated with stream flow and allows the opportunity cost of these “uses” of 
water to be reflected in the market prices facing traditional water users. In practice, 
however, states have had mixed success using markets to secure instream flow. 
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These successes and failures illustrate both the promises and the challenges of 
creating property rights to non-use characteristics of natural resources. 
Across most of the West, surface water is allocated under the prior 
appropriation doctrine, which was developed during the latter half of the nineteenth 
century to facilitate coordinated investment in irrigation infrastructure that made 
farming in the arid West feasible.248 Appropriative water rights were allocated on a 
first-come, first-served basis. To establish a water right, users are required to divert 
water and put it to “beneficial use.” Once established, the rights are subject to the 
“use it or lose it” doctrine, which threatens the loss of a water right that is not 
continually put to a legally approved beneficial use.249 As with other natural 
resources in the West, these provisions were meant to forestall speculation and 
ensure broad access for potential migrants. 
Over time, the relative scarcity of surface water flows in western states 
has forced institutional change as new demands for water emerge. Although 
agriculture accounts for 80 percent of surface water withdrawals in the West, 
population growth and urbanization are becoming increasingly important sources 
of demand even as climate change threatens to reduce both the availability and 
reliability of water resources.250 Today, many streams across the West are over-
appropriated, meaning that legal claims to water exceed actual water available 
within a given year, often leading to the complete “dewatering” of streams during 
especially dry years.251 
In response to these changes a fundamentally different type of water 
demand has emerged: the demand for instream flows (ISF)—essentially a non-use 
form of water right. Increasingly, researchers, policymakers, and recreational 
enthusiasts have come to appreciate the economic value of water left in streams 
that supply natural amenities, water quality benefits (via dilution), and critical 
habitat for endangered and recreationally valuable species. Estimates of the value 
of ISF for recreation and amenity provision vary according to the base level of 
flow, time of year, and location across the West.252 Often, augmented instream 
flows are also required at specific times and locations for compliance with federal 
regulation such as the Clean Water Act and the Endangered Species Act.253 
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The tradeoff between traditional off-stream uses of water and these in-
stream uses is sharpened by the fact that ISF is most valuable when flow is low and 
water is scarce in the late summer, which is exactly when off-stream demand for 
irrigation is greatest.254 Much like hydrocarbons, grazing, and timber, the benefits 
of extractive water use are private and appropriable, whereas the amenity and 
existence value generated by ISF are public goods that are potentially global in 
nature.255 
Unlike the other resources discussed in this article, a legal framework 
exists for the provision of instream flows for environmental purposes by both 
private and public entities. Water rights are administered on a state-by-state basis, 
and there is significant heterogeneity in the nature and success of different states’ 
efforts to support market-based provision of instream flows. The starting point for 
market-based provision in any state is the capacity for a secure property right to 
water that is left instream. Traditionally, ISF was essentially treated as unused 
water left in the public domain and was therefore appropriable for subsequent 
extraction. To enable non-use rights to water, states would have to revise the 
definition of what is considered a “beneficial use” of water to include instream 
flows, as many have done.256 
Beginning in the 1960s, each of the western states has made at least some 
move to categorize environmental flows as a “beneficial use” of water, but the legal 
certainty surrounding these rights varies by state. In California, Colorado, and 
Oregon, for instance, instream flows are defined as a beneficial use by statute.257 In 
other states, such as Nevada and New Mexico, this determination is based on 
judicial precedent, making ISF rights much less secure.258 States vary on other 
margins including whether private parties can transfer or hold ISF rights, the 
degree of oversight and administrative approval required for transfers to 
environmental uses, and the level of funding for instream flow purchases. 
Defining a property right to ISF raises a variety of conceptual challenges 
even after its status as a beneficial use is legally secure. Enforcement of traditional 
off-stream water rights involves monitoring when, where, and how much water is 
diverted. Enforcing ISF rights requires a different framework because no diversions 
occur. Instead, protecting an ISF right requires determining how much water must 
be left in a stream and measuring ISF at a particular point in time along a particular 
stream reach.259 
Another question that arises in defining ISF rights is their duration. In 
practice, some states have allowed short-term leases of ISF rights while others only 
accommodate environmental water rights in the form of a permanent retirement of 
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existing off-stream rights.260 Leases can be advantageous for helping to meet 
critical streamflow thresholds during unexpected droughts, whereas permanent 
rights are often more contentious with traditional water users. States also vary in 
whether they allow private parties to hold ISF rights—in many cases only the state 
can formally hold these rights due to fears of speculation.261 
In practice, the conceptual difficulties of creating property rights to “non-
use” water are not the primary barrier to ISF transactions. Rather, problems arise 
because ISF transactions have the potential to impair the property rights of existing 
water users by altering the timing, nature, and amount of flow on stream 
systems.262 There is a large literature in law and in economics exploring 
impairment and third-party externalities of water markets more broadly, with ISF 
as a special case. We emphasize that these problems, though important, are 
unlikely to arise in the context of federally owned minerals, land, and timber where 
there are not pre-existing and overlapping private property rights. In what follows, 
we focus on legal and administrative factors that can make market-based provision 
of ISF more or less robust. 
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Table 1: Summary of States’ Instream Flow Success263 
State Status of ISF 
as “Beneficial 
Use” 
Ability of 
Private 
Parties to 
hold ISF 
Rights 
Average 
Review Time 
Number of 
ISF 
Transactions 
Arizona Limited 
Statutory 
Limited N/A 0 
California Statutory Yes 4-15 months 34 
Colorado Statutory No 6.5 years 34 
Idaho Limited 
Statutory 
No 4 months 7 
Montana Limited 
Statutory 
Yes 16-24 months 50 
Nevada Not Statutory Yes NA 57 
New Mexico Not Statutory Unknown NA 1 
Oregon Statutory No 1-36 months 1800 
Utah Statutory Limited 1-2 years 8 
Washington Statutory Limited 6 months - 6 
years 
1118 
Wyoming Statutory No 1 year 1 
 
Table 1 summarizes the legal status of ISF rights, who can hold those 
rights, the degree of administrative oversight, and the total number of ISF 
transactions in each of the 11 western states as of 2015. Table 1 makes it clear that 
there is no simple recipe for success of ISF programs, as some states with relatively 
restrictive ISF rights have nonetheless seen active provision of funds for devoting 
water to ISF. Oregon stands out as a leader in ISF transactions even though private 
parties cannot hold ISF rights. On the other hand, Arizona has not had a single 
successful ISF transaction despite appearing to have the requisite legal framework 
in place. We briefly review these two states’ experience with ISF transactions and 
draw lessons for the design of non-use rights more broadly. 
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A. Oregon’s Instream Flow Success 
Despite not allowing private parties to hold ISF rights, Oregon 
nevertheless has one of the most robust legal frameworks for supporting private 
provision of ISF.264 Flows to benefit fish, wildlife, and recreation are all recognized 
as beneficial uses under statute.265 Private parties can convert existing rights to ISF 
rights, which are then held in trust by the state.266 Unlike many other states, Oregon 
places few limitations on the spatial or substantive nature of transfers from 
traditional to environmental uses. Perhaps the most crucial feature of Oregon’s 
institutional framework is its expedited approval process for short-term leases (less 
than 5 years), which has dramatically reduced administrative delay—leases make 
up the majority of ISF transfers denoted in Table 1. 
Oregon has seen more environmental water transfers than any other state, 
driven both by state-mandated conservation and efforts by private parties. On the 
mandatory side, over 500 previously established regulatory minimum flow 
requirements have been converted to ISF rights.267 Private actors have also played a 
pivotal role in transferring water to environmental uses throughout the state. The 
Oregon Freshwater Trust, a private nonprofit entity, successfully protected over 
124 cubic feet per second across 11 river basins between its founding in 1993 and 
2004.268 Rather than litigating or lobbying to reduce water use, the Trust works 
with ranchers, farmers, and other stakeholders to find ways to conserve water and 
convert existing extractive rights to ISF rights. 
The Freshwater Trust is not the only facilitator of ISF transactions in 
Oregon. Other players include the Deschutes River Conservancy, Environmental 
Defense Fund, and the Nature Conservancy.269 Although leases and permanent 
rights are ultimately held in trust by the state, private non-profit groups play a 
crucial role organizing and financing transfers. Overcoming opposition from 
existing water users who fear potential impairment of their rights often involves 
repeated negotiations and innovative contractual arrangements. Although these 
agreements can be costly to arrange, they ultimately result in mutually beneficial 
exchange, with existing users being compensated for changes in their water use. 
B. Arizona’s Struggle to Dedicate Instream Flow 
In contrast to Oregon, Arizona has yet to approve a transfer of an existing 
water right to instream uses. The state has initiated a variety of new ISF rights that 
are junior to existing off-stream uses but struggles with multiple barriers that bar 
private groups from successfully facilitating ISF transfers. Environmental and 
recreational uses are protected by statute but are considered a lower priority than 
traditional extractive uses. Private parties initiate and receive transfers of ISF 
rights, but those rights only maintain their priority date if the state acts as the 
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recipient. The administrative review process for establishing a new ISF right is also 
burdensome and slow.270 Taken together, these factors increase the cost of 
protecting water via property rights while also creating uncertainty about the 
potential benefits of this approach.  
Administrative hurdles aside, the generally uncertain nature of surface 
water rights in Arizona presents perhaps the greatest challenge for ISF transfers. 
According to state law, surface water is allocated under the prior appropriation 
doctrine, but groundwater is subject only to “reasonable use” restrictions.271 The 
hydrologic connectivity of surface and groundwater resources, combined with this 
dual regulatory framework, has generated considerable uncertainty about the 
security of many surface water rights across the state.272 
The general lack of reliable protection of surface water rights from 
impairment via groundwater pumping reduces the utility of ISF rights. Private 
parties can establish new ISF rights, but those rights would be junior to any 
“reasonable” groundwater users and so have limited capacity to secure crucial flow 
during drought.273 The reality of these barriers is underscored by the fact that 35 
percent of perennial streams in Arizona no longer flow.274 Thus, the failure of ISF 
rights in Arizona has less to do with difficulties associated with non-use in 
particular and more to do with broader uncertainties in Arizona’s approach to water 
law. 
When drawing lessons for non-use rights in general, it is important to note 
that many of the barriers to successful ISF programs are based on conflicts over the 
existing distribution of property rights to water. Oregon has successfully mitigated 
many of these conflicts by adopting a streamlined administrative review process 
with backstop protections that allow ISF rights to be cancelled if harm is 
established ex post.275 On the other end of the spectrum, Arizona’s struggle with 
ISF stems from an inability to resolve border disputes between surface and 
groundwater users. In theory, establishing non-use property rights should be much 
easier for federally owned resources where conflicts among many competing 
private property holders are not at issue. 
8. CONCLUSION 
Environmental issues are often characterized as inherently political issues 
given the realities of public goods and the free-rider problems associated with 
them. However, a fundamental point of this article is that such concerns are not the 
only factors that drive the outcomes we observe. The legal ability—or inability—of 
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conservation groups to purchase, trade, or bargain for non-use rights to natural 
resources is at the core of the issue. 
This article casts doubt on the popular view held by environmental 
economists, legal scholars, and policymakers that the non-use values associated 
with natural amenities can only be provided through public ownership of natural 
resources and landscapes with high conservation value. The special characteristics 
of unique landscapes and natural amenities raise the possibility that private parties’ 
efforts to protect these environmental goods could be much closer to the socially 
efficient level than is often supposed. Preferences for environmental amenities are 
likely to be heterogeneous and satiable, so that the highly motivated few may 
provide something close to efficient conservation for the many. 
The existing structure and distribution of state and federally administered 
property rights to natural resources evolved to facilitate traditional, extractive uses 
during westward expansion and is not well-suited to accommodate non-use values. 
As non-use demands increase, there is mounting pressure for institutional change. 
If the lessons from federal grazing policy, oil and gas leasing, timber sales, and 
western water rights are any guide, institutional change will be slow and hard 
fought. This thinking is consistent with Libecap and other economic historians, 
who emphasize how high political transaction costs stymie property rights reform, 
even if existing rights do not promote efficient resource use.276 Nevertheless, an 
important starting point for institutional reform is a more complete understanding 
of how existing institutions prevent welfare-enhancing trades from occurring. 
To be sure, conceptual difficulties arise when developing property rights 
to protect non-use values associated with landscapes and resources. Should 
transactions be temporary contracts, or last in perpetuity? Who should be allowed 
to hold non-use rights? How can these rights be defined and enforced? We propose 
these as excellent questions for future research by both legal scholars and 
economists. But we emphasize that, as examples from surface water and other 
state-managed natural resources illustrate, the barriers to developing non-use rights 
are not insurmountable. 
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